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DOES HEAT EMANATE BEYOND THE THRESHOLD?:
HOME INFRARED EMISSIONS, REMOTE SENSING,
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
THRESHOLD*

SUSAN MOORE**
INTRODUCrION

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the fundamental right of Americans to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures by their government.' It provides our principal
constitutional protection against unjustified government intrusions
2
into individual privacy and property interests.
Does this constitutional right protect individuals from unwarranted use of advanced remote sensing technology 3 to gather information about activity within American homes? The Supreme Court has
not directly addressed this question. However, it has held that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect the people from sophisticated
government investigatory tactics, however unreasonable, which cir4
cumvent the Court's complex Fourth Amendment threshold test.
* This note was inspired by, and is now dedicated to, my dear father, who loved freedom
and reason. Rest in peace.
** Senior law student at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 377-79 (1974). Notwithstanding the other safeguards provided within the Constitution, "the
limits of American society's effective control over the largest part of the spectrum of police
powers and potential abuses depend upon the scope given to the fourth amendment." Id. at 377.
Although legislatures are constitutionally empowered to provide protection against government
intrusions, legislators generally consider it political suicide to act to control law enforcement
activities. Id. at 378-79.
3. Remote sensing is a branch of technology that uses sensors and computers to analyze
objects of investigation from a remote location. See infra part I.
4. See generally Melvin Gutterman, A Formulationof the Value and Means Models of the
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRAcusE L. REV.
647 (1988). "Presently, the Court measures the existence of fourth amendment privacy solely by
reference to... [a] 'means model"' rather than a "privacy model." Id. at 650. "This approach
fails to protect privacy rights, and permits their gradual decay with each improved technological
advance." Id.
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The threshold question in Fourth Amendment analysis is whether
the conduct
of government agents constitutes either a "search" or a
"seizure." 5 This question correctly recognizes that our government
performs a host of legitimate functions that bring its agents into contact with the people in ways that cannot be described as searches or
seizures. 6 Where the Court finds that particular government action
involved a Fourth Amendment search or seizure, it continues its
Fourth Amendment analysis to determine whether the government's
intrusion was reasonable. 7 If no search or seizure is found, the Fourth
Amendment inquiry ends and its protections will not apply.8
How the Court delineates the Fourth Amendment threshold has
a profound impact on American liberty. The threshold analysis determines which types of government intrusions require some justification. Thus, it is our nation's principal restraint on unbridled, arbitrary
police action. 9
Although most Fourth Amendment questions come before the
Court within the context of criminal cases,' 0 the Court's threshold de5. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.1 (2d ed. 1987).
6. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.5 (1967) ("Virtually every govern-

mental action interferes with personal privacy to some degree. The question in each case is
whether that interference violates a command of the United States Constitution.").
7. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from performing "reasonable" searches and seizures. For comprehensive discussions of the tests for "reasonableness,"
see LAFAVE, supra note 5, and Amsterdam, supra note 2. With some exceptions, searches and
seizures are presumptively unreasonable unless they are based on probable cause and performed
with a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Unlike a police officer, a magistrate
is not "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Exceptions include searches performed with consent and where exigent circumstances require immediate action. 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 8:1, 14:1 (2d ed.
1991).

Probable cause has not been clearly defined. However, it requires at least a fair probability
that evidence of crime is located in the place to be searched. Id. § 3:7.
8. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 388. "It is only 'searches' and 'seizures' that the fourth
amendment requires to be reasonable: police activities of any other sort may be as unreasonable
as the police please to make them." Id.
9. "The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this
Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
See generally Amsterdam, supra note 2. Amsterdam's article provides a comprehensive
analysis of how, absent judicial review, police activity is necessarily arbitrary and discriminatory.
When the Court struggles with the understandably difficult task of Fourth Amendment analysis,
the "Court [is] in the throes of one of its noblest labors. That labor is to be the instrument by
which a free society imposes on itself the seldom welcome, sometimes dangerous, always indispensable restraints that keep it free." Id. at 353.
10. Most Fourth Amendment decisions are made in judgment on a criminal defendant's
motion to exclude evidence that was acquired in violation of Fourth Amendment protections.
Although Fourth Amendment rights may be legally enforceable in civil and criminal actions
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cisions affect all of us-criminal suspects and non-suspects alike.'1
Where the Court is unwilling to characterize particular government
investigatory tactics as either a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court is effectively holding that such tactics do not
require reasonable justification, regardless of whether the subject of
investigation is a criminal or a law abiding citizen. 12 Consequently, all
Americans become widely exposed to such investigatory methods that
may be exercised without a warrant, at the discretion of government
agents, and free from judicial review.
The Court first considered the Fourth Amendment threshold
question in 1886.13 During the 100 years that followed, the Court had
to determine the reach of Fourth Amendment protections within the
context of increasingly sophisticated methods of investigation, coupled with waves of public concern over crime and political subversion. 14 This challenge particularly burgeoned over the last two
against government officers who violate them, such actions are rarely maintained, or as a practical matter, maintainable. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 360.
11. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protectingthe Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983). "The Fourth Amendment is designed to protect innocent
people ....
IId. at 1272; see also OFFCEOF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NEW TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE CONsTIrTUlON (1988) [hereinafter NEW
TECHNOLOGIES].
In the past, concern about surveillance and privacy has generally focused on the constitutional rights of individuals who are suspected of criminal activity. But many people
are now concerned that the increasing use of monitoring techniques may impinge on
the privacy of the general public, and indicates a subtle widening of the net of social
control that goes far beyond traditional democratic practices.
Id. at 4.
12. Anthony Amsterdam stated:
[U]nless the fourth amendment controls tom-peeping and subjects it to a requirement
of antecedent cause to believe that what is inside any particular window is indeed criminal, police may look through windows and observe a thousand innocent acts for every
guilty act they spy out.... The question is not whether you or I must draw the blinds
before we commit a crime. It is whether you and I must discipline ourselves to draw
the blinds every time we enter a room, under pain of surveillance if we do not.
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 403.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 46-54.
14. See, e.g., WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE (1958). In this book, Justice Douglas reaffirmed the need for vigilant protection of constitutional liberties during the
post-World War II era, when the nation was overwhelmed by its fear of communism and the
growth of the military imperiled civilian authority. With regard to the Fourth Amendment,
Douglas was particularly concerned about the use of wire-tapping:
The legal controversies over the application of... [the Fourth] Amendment have
been numerous. Every Fourth Amendment contest involves to a degree an issue of
privacy. The right to be secure in one's own castle, the right to be free of snoopers, the
right to keep the officers of the law out of one's bedroom and out of one's files are the
values at stake in many of these contests. None has been more dramatic than the contests over wire-tapping.
... [T]he controversy ... has been whether wire-tapping is a search within the
meaning of the Amendment. If so, it requires a showing of probable cause to a magistrate that a crime has been or is being committed before a wire can be tapped. If not, it
goes unregulated except as Congress or the States legislate concerning it.
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decades as the government accelerated its development and use of
technological innovations in the investigation of crime. 15
The modem Court's threshold analysis regarding searches is
alarming. 16 The modem Court has legitimized, by making unreviewable, the government's use of many sophisticated surveillance techniques, which are used to gather information about the private lives of
the people. It has done so by defining a "search" in terms that cannot
be reconciled with Fourth Amendment precedent, nor with common
understandings of the word "search."'1 7 Instead, the current measure
of a Fourth Amendment search is derived through a complex judicial
assessment of individual and societal expectations regarding the risks
of modem living. This assessment has pushed many modem investiId. at 149; see also SENATOR EDWARD V. LONG, THE INTRUDERS: Tim INVASION OF PRIVACY BY
GOVERNMENT & INDUSTRY (Frederick A. Praeger 1967) (1966). Writing about progressive challenges to Fourth Amendment rights, Senator Long observed, "During our nation's first century,
searches and seizures were physical in nature and therefore clearly visible to the naked judicial
eye. But wiretapping and other technological advances have introduced subtle, complicated elements." Id. at 128.
Senator Long was alarmed about the proliferation of electronic surveillance of citizens in

our society. He wrote:
Excessive pressures are already here in abundance and, unless they are recognized and
stopped, we may slip past the point of no return. Over twenty-five years of hot and
cold wars have dulled our sensitivities to individual freedom. So-called security has
become an overriding concern to many Americans. It does not occur to many Americans that the men who drafted the Bill of Rights were quite familiar with espionage,
sabotage, subversion, murder, mayhem, larceny, and robbery. Yet they chose the freedom guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and the other provisions of our Constitution. These men could have had security as a colony of Britain, but they chose
freedom. In the words of Jefferson, "Timid men ... prefer the calm of despotism to the
boisterous seas of liberty."
Id. at 61.
15. See NEW TECHNOLOIEoS, supra note 11.
As recently as the 1960s, criminal justice institutions lagged far behind business
and Federal Government agencies in adopting new technology. Then, in 1967, the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice made
sweeping recommendations for modernizing the administration of criminal justice with
new technologies. The technological innovations that followed in the next two decades
have transformed nearly every component of the criminal justice system.
Id. at 1 (referring to THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETv 244-71 (1967)).

16. Searches involve intrusions into privacy interests, while seizures involve interferences
with possessory interests. 2 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 19:8 (2d ed.
1993). This Note considers the threshold test for searches only. The threshold test for seizures is
beyond its scope.
17. Common definitions of "search" include: "to look at or examine ... carefully in order to
find something concealed"; "to look at, read, or examine ... for information"; "to inquire, investigate, examine, or seek." Tim RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
Unabridged (2d ed. 1987).
For an in depth analysis on this subject, see Clark D. Cunningham, A LinguisticAnalysis of
the Meanings of "Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L
REV. 541 (1988).
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gatory methods virtually beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement.
The Court may soon consider whether government use of a particular class of remote sensing technology, thermal infrared imaging
systems, may constitute a Fourth Amendment search subject to warrant requirements and judicial review. Since 1991, several federal district courts have held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated
when government agents, acting without a warrant, inspected individuals' homes by using Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) systems, or
equivalent devices, to read and analyze the characteristics of invisible
thermal infrared emissions.18 The Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts have agreed with this line of cases. 19
However, not all courts agree. In February 1994, a district court
became the first federal court to conclude that the Fourth Amend20
ment prohibited a warrantless FLIR inspection of a private building.
That same month, the Supreme Court of Washington held that both
its state constitution and the Fourth Amendment protect individuals
21
against warrantless home infrared inspections.
The FLIR-related Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires serious and careful regard. The FLIR is one member of a broad class of
technology that enables sweeping clandestine surveillance from remote locations. How the courts resolve the threshold question with
regard to the FLIR necessarily lays a foundation for deciding Fourth
Amendment challenges to an entire breed of high-tech surveillance
practices of Orwellian dimensions. Thus, the underlying question
lurking within the FLIR cases is where, if anywhere, the judiciary will
draw the line on advanced remote surveillance of the American
citizenry.
18. United States v. Domitrovich, No. CR-93-295-FVS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6928 (E.D.
Wash. Mar. 24, 1994); United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393 (D. Wyo. 1994); United States v.
Kyilo, 809 F. Supp. 787 (D. Or. 1992), remandedfor evidentiary hr'g, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir, 1994);
United Sates v. Deaner, No. CR-92-0090-01, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13046 (M.D. Pa. July 27,
1992), affd on other grounds, 1 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F.
Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd on other grounds, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
19. United States v. Ishmael, No. 94-40159, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4957 (5th Cir. Mar. 15,
1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056
(8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 664 (1994); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir.
1994).
20. United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (order granting defendants'
motion to suppress), rev'd, No. 94-40159, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4957 (5th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995);
see also, United States v. Field, No. 94-CR-0013-C, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8829 (W.D Wis. June
9, 1994) (holding that thermal imaging of a residence constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.)
21. Washington v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994). The Washington constitution protects
an individual's home and "private affairs" from warrantless searches. Id. at 597 (referring to
WASH. CONsT. art. 1, § 7).
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This Note argues that the Fourth Amendment applies to government use of remote thermal infrared devices in particular and remote
sensing devices in general. Part I discusses remote sensing technology
and the government's use of thermal imaging devices. Part II reviews
the origin and evolution of the Fourth Amendment threshold analysis,
and its modem application. Part III criticizes the modern threshold
test for its overall failure to offer protection to free citizens in a technologically advanced nation. The Court is urged to reorient its threshold analysis so that judicial review will be available as a check on
intrusive remote sensing surveillance. Part IV discusses and analyzes
five thermal imaging cases from four federal districts and one state
supreme court. 22 These cases embody the gamut of facts and legal
analysis that are shaping this area of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.

I. REMOTE SENSING AND
FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED (FLIR) SYSTEMS
A.

What are Remote Sensing Systems?

Remote sensing is a branch of technology that combines physics
and electronics to derive information that may be otherwise inaccessible. 23 Remote sensing systems use special sensors to gather data
about their objects of investigation, without making physical contact
with the objects. Computers analyze this data and convert it into
meaningful information.
Most remote sensing systems detect and analyze electromagnetic
radiation (EMR).24 All natural and synthetic substances both emit
and reflect EMR in their own characteristic manner according to their
chemical composition and physical state. Through remote sensing systems, these distinctive features and conditions become recognizable
"signatures" that make it possible to identify individual objects. 25
22. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205; Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787; Deaner, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13046; Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220; Young, 867 P.2d 593.
23. See generally THOMAS E. AVERY & GRAYDON L. BERLIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF REMOTE
SENSING AND AIRPHOTO INTERPRETATION (5th ed. 1992).

24. 1& at 1. EMR is "electromagnetic energy in transit that can only be detected when it
interacts with matter." Id. at 3. Electromagnetic energy is "associated with atomic nuclei during
fission and fusion reactions, with electrons as they drop from high-[energy] to lower-energy
orbits in an atom or molecule, and with the random movement of atoms and molecules." Id. at
1.
25. See id. at 14-15. Perhaps the most familiar, natural EMR remote sensing system involves the human eye and brain, which work together to detect the unique characteristics of an
object's EMR, in the form of visual light, and interpret this "data" into meaningful information
about the object. See id. at 1, 5-6.
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Through imaging systems, computers translate these signatures into
"user-friendly" visual images.
Visible light makes up a tiny fraction of the full spectrum of
EMR. EMR also includes invisible "spectral regions" such as gamma,
X-ray, ultraviolet, infrared, microwave, and radio energy. The full
EMR spectrum is several million times broader than the region per26
ceptible through visible light.
Remote sensing systems have been developed that can detect and
interpret data throughout the EMR spectrum. Multispectral systems
integrate the data derived from multiple spectral regions, allowing
more complex and meaningful analyses. Through multitemporal remote sensing, additional data is gathered over time and makes it possible to monitor changes in objects of investigation. 27 Most of these
remote sensing systems operate from robotic earth observation satellites. 28 Satellite imaging technology has been described as "one of the
most powerful tools in America's espionage arsenal." 29
B. FLIR Systems
FLIR systems are real-time thermal infrared scanning and imaging systems that were developed as night surveillance tools for the
military.30 Since all objects with temperatures above absolute zero 31
continually emit distinctive thermal infrared radiation, these thermal
imaging systems can detect and identify an object of investigation
26. ld.
at 5.
27. Id&at 17-18 (discussing the "multi" concept in remote sensing).
28. For a thorough description of electromagnetic radiation and practical applications of
remote sensing systems, see generally AVERY & BERLiN, supra note 23. Remote sensing systems
are extensively employed by the United States and foreign governments and by private industry.
Common applications include military operations, archaeology, urban-industrial planning and

maintenance, and environment studies. See generally id.
at chs. 6-14. For additional information
about earth observation satellites and their applications, see generally HAROLD HOUGH, SATELLrE SURVEILLANCE (1991).

29. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. to Allow Sale of the Technology for Spy Satellites, N.Y.
Tirms, Mar. 11, 1994, at Al (referring to the concerns of some security experts in response to the
Clinton Administration's decision to make these systems available to commercial customers
internationally).
30. The military continues to develop FLIR technology. The United States Army Chief of

Staff, describing the development of advanced military technology for the twenty-first century,
includes the new 2d generation FLIR technology. Fiscal Year 1995 Budget and the Postureof the
United States Army, Before the Subcomm. on Defense Comm. on Appropriations,103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 169-71 (1994) (statement of General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, United States

Army) [hereinafter General Sullivan statement].
31. Absolute zero is expressed as 0 K on the Kelvin scale. It is equal to -459.69 degrees on
the Fahrenheit scale and -273.16 degrees on the Celsius scale. AVERY & BERLIN, supra note 23,

at 2. At a temperature of absolute zero, all random motions of atoms and molecules cease. Id.
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both day and night. 32 FLIRs are equipped with video monitors that
display immediate, high resolution images of the objects. Distinctive
temperature contrasts are shown by displaying tonal or color variations across the objects' surfaces. FLIRs are very portable and are
often operated from ground-based vehicles, airplanes, and helicopters. 33 Recently, high-resolution hand-held infrared viewers have also
become available. 34
FLIRs are sensitive enough to remotely identify the heat 35 generated by a heart beat. Thus, they are useful in search and rescue missions, for outdoor night surveillance, and to detect and analyze
activity occurring within enclosed structures. FLIRs are also used for
a variety of commercial applications.3 6
FLIRs are currently being used in the United States by domestic
law enforcement agencies. 37 During its siege of the Branch Davidian
32. FLIR systems focus thermal infrared radiation with an optical system that is equipped
with scan mirrors. These mirrors move the image over detectors, which in turn produce variablevoltage signals. The signals are amplified and processed into standard video signals. Id. at 13334.
33. See id. at 133-34.
34. See generally Thermal Imaging: The Language of Heat, CERAMIC INDUsTRY, Oct. 1993,
at 43, 44 (reporting that Flr Systems Inc. (FSI) of Portland, Oregon, had recently introduced
"what [FSI] considers a revolutionary hand-held infrared viewer." Known as the Prism, the
viewer offers high-resolution video images, and is ideal for security and surveillance applications,
as well as a broad range of industrial applications); see also Handheld, Low-Cost IR Viewer Spots
Thermal Images, 14 ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECH., July 15, 1993, at 12 (The device combines innovative technological advances into an eight pound package priced below $35,000).
35. "Infrared radiation is generally associated with heat because heat is its most easily detected effect."

ACADEMIC AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 175 (1992).

36. See, e.g., Handheld, Low-Cost IR Viewer Spots Thermal Images, supra note 34. Thermal
imaging devices are used for a broad range of commercial applications, including environmental
monitoring, predictive and preventive maintenance of electrical and mechanical systems, structural analysis, and process control. Id.
37. See GM Hughes, Texas Instruments Introduce Night Vision System to Help Police See in
the Dark, PR Newswire, Oct. 17, 1993 (Financial News), available in LEXIS, Nexis NEWS Library, PRNEWS File, at *1 (A new product, the NIGHTSIGHT thermal imaging system, is
shown at the International Association of Chiefs of Police convention by two leading defense
electronic firms.); Mesa, Ariz., Police Receive Two MD 500E Helicopters, PR Newswire, Oct. 6,
1993 (Financial News), available in LEXIS, Nexis NEWS Library, PRNEWS File, at *1 (helicopters are equipped with FLIR systems); Kelly Pearce, A New Meaningfor 'Hot Pursuit;Infrared
Tool Helps Copter Crews Track Prey, ARIz REPUBUC, Jan. 18, 1994, at 1 (describing the use of
FLIR-equipped helicopters by city, county, and state law enforcement agencies, to fight crime,
spot fires, and conduct search and rescues. One officer said that, with the FLIR systems, "[w]e
have found people hiding upstairs, in trees, and in bushes ....
[T]he system is a terrific time
saver. It takes the guesswork out of police work"); Pennsylvania State Police Helicopters Get
Infrared Night Eyes, PR Newswire, Nov. 15, 1993 (State and Regional News), available in
LEXIS, Nexis NEWS Library, PRNEWS File, at *1 (reporting the installation of airborne thermal imaging systems, funded by a $282,000 federal grant); Paul Proctor, Helicopter Flexibility
Attracts Police Use, 139 AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 9, 1993, at 42 (A 1992 survey by
the Airborne Law Enforcement Association showed that airborne units participated in more
than 27,000 arrests. Survey respondents represented only 40% of the association's membership);
Paul Valentine, Puttingthe Heaton Crime at Night State Police Helicopters Use Infrared Cameras
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complex in Waco, Texas, the FBI used FLIRs to monitor outdoor
areas at night and to determine whether specific rooms were occupied. 38 The United States Justice Department's Drug Enforcement
Agency reports that thermal imaging technology is commonly used, in
conjunction with other surveillance methods, to detect indoor marijuana growing operations. 39
Some federal and state agencies have requested assistance from
the United States Department of Defense, asking that military aircraft
equipped with FLIRs be used to produce infrared images of buildings
on private American land. 40 According to the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel, such assistance should not constitute a

to Detect Wrongdoers, WASH. POST,Oct. 21, 1993 (Maryland Weekly), at Md. 1, 4 (describing
Maryland's purchase of FLIRs and French-made Aerospatiale Dauphin choppers and the recent
identification of an in-door marijuana operation); Gene Warner, City Police Take to the Sky to
Cope with Criminals, BUFFALO NEWS,Sept. 22, 1993, at 1 (Buffalo, New York, "Sky Cops" are
patrolling the streets); cf.Michael Barnes, Blimps on the Rise, TECH. REV., Jan. 1994, at 46, 51-52
(To combat bombings in Britain, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense plans to equip
blimps, which operate at 5,000 feet, with thermal imaging systems to track people at night, and
with directional microphones to intercept ground conversations).
38. FBI Kept Tabs on Cult with High-Tech Gear, ST. Louis PosT-DisPATCH, Apr. 21, 1993,
at 12A. "Law enforcement sources said radio transmitters smaller than cigarettes had been
smuggled into the cult's compound, while heat-sensitive surveillance equipment 'watched' the
compound from outside.... One source said agents used 'flirs'... to watch outdoor areas of the
compound at night and even determine whether specific rooms were occupied." Id
39. Lisa J. Steele, Waste Heat and Garbage: The Legalization of Warrantless Infrared
Searches, 29 CiuM. L. BULL- 29, 39 (1993) (citing DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, 1990 DOMESTIC CANNABIS ERADICATION AND SUPPRESSION PROJECT FINAL REPORT 23 (1990) [hereinafter DEA 1990 REPORT]).

Indoor marijuana operations are immune to visual observations from outdoors. They are detectible only by the amount of water and electricity used and by the heat produced by grow lights.
Id at 20. During 1990, "off the shelf thermal video technology. . . was utilized in numerous
locations throughout the United States to support justification of a probable cause conclusion.
The thermal surveillance data along with other investigative information were used in numerous
search warrant affidavits." Id. at 39 (citing DEA 1990 REPORT, supra at 29); see also Tim Bryant,
DEA Targets Indoor Pot Growers, ST. LoUiS POST-DISPATCH, May 9, 1993, at ID (describing
DEA surveillance techniques in identifying indoor, hydroponic marijuana growing operations.
The article also reported an incident where police, expecting to find a home indoor marijuana
farm, instead found an indoor orchid garden); see generally W. Conard Holton, Shedding new
light on crime; includes related articles; A Special Staff Report: Tales From the Dark Side,
PHOTOTONiCS SPECTRA, Dec. 1992, at 52. The author describes the growth of photonic technologies, including FLIRS, in law enforcement. He reports that the federal Office of National Drug
Control Policy's (ONDCP) Counter-Drug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) "acts as the
central research and development coordinating group for drug-fighting organizations like the
FBI, DEA, Coast Guard, Customs Service, DARPA and the DoD." i at 58. The office has
recently focused on the development of wide-area surveillance and nonintrusive inspections, including "the use of radar, IR, UV, optical sensors and data-management and information-exploitation networks." Id. at 59.
40. Timothy E. Flanigan, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
Fourth Amendment Implications of Military Use of Forward Looking Infrared Radars Technology to Assist Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, 1992 WL 479541 at *1 (O.L.C. Mar. 4, 1992).
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"search" under the Fourth Amendment. 41 Nor, according to that office, should such military participation constitute a "search" prohibited under Chapter 18 of Title 10 of the United States Code.4 2 This
statute delineates the extent to which the military may provide assistance to civilian law enforcement, and requires the Secretary of Defense to prevent "direct participation by a member of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other
'43
similar activity.
During the 1990s, individuals challenged the constitutionality of
warrantless FLIR inspections of their privately owned buildings. The
diverse court opinions in these cases demonstrate a lack of consensus
on how to apply the modern Fourth Amendment threshold analysis,
particularly with regard to sense-enhanced surveillance. The differences reflect a clash among Supreme Court opinions, which fail to articulate a coherent approach to Fourth Amendment threshold analysis
where the government uses advanced investigative techniques.
II.

EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
THRESHOLD ANALYSIS

A.

The Foundation

The Fourth Amendment is founded upon the 500 year old common law maxim that a "man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet,
he is well guarded as a prince in his castle."" In his 1868 treatise on
41. Id. The Office of Legal Counsel was responding to a request for an opinion from the
Department of Defense's General Counsel. Although Defense's General Counsel had concluded that FLIR surveillance of houses constituted a Fourth Amendment search, the Department of Justice disagreed. Id.
42. J. Michael Lutting, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Military Use
of Infrared Radars Technology to Assist Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, 1991 WL 499885 at
*1 (O.L.C. Feb. 19, 1991) The Office was responding to a request from the Department of
Defense's General Counsel, asking whether federal statutes prohibit Defense from assisting the
DEA and other agencies, in the use of FLIRs to identify or confirm suspected illegal drug production. The Justice Department responded that the assistance is authorized by 10 U.S.C.
§§ 374-75). Id.
The Justice Department said that "the meaning of the term 'search' in § 375 was not intended to be coextensive with the meaning of the same term in the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 3.
Instead, when Congress used the term 'search' in section 375, it intended that the term
encompass at most only searches involving physical contact with civilians or their property, and perhaps only searches involving physical contact that are likely to result in a
direct confrontation between military personnel and civilians.
Id.
43. Id. at 2 (referring to 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-75 and quoting § 375).
44. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1358 (1992)
(citing Paxton's Case, Superior Ct. 1761, reprinted in Quincy's Mass. Rep. 1761-62, 51 (1865)).
The maxim came from the English case of Y.B. 21 Hen. 7, fo. 39, pl. 50 (1499), cited in 2 THE
REPORTS OF SIR Jor SPELLMAN 316 n.2 (J. H. Baker ed., 1978). Gormley, supra at 1358.
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Constitutional Limitations, Judge Thomas Cooley wrote that the
Fourth Amendment incorporates this maxim, "secur[ing] to the citizen

immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the government, and
protection in person, property, and papers even against the process of
'45
law, except in a few specified cases.
The United States Supreme Court considered the Fourth Amendment threshold question for the first time in 1886, in Boyd v. United

States. 6 The case concerned a customs revenue statute that allowed a
court to order a defendant to produce his books and papers in a civil
forfeiture action. The Boyd Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on government searches were not limited to intru-

sions on private premises. 47 It held that compulsory production of

48
private books and papers was the equivalent of a search and seizure.
The Boyd Court found guidance for its decision in the events that

precipitated the American revolution, and which provided the impetus for including the Fourth Amendment within the Constitution. The

opinion recalled the infamous colonial practice of issuing writs of
assistance that empowered government agents, at their own discretion, to search private premises for contraband. 49 The Court cited
James Otis, who decried this practice which put "the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer" and thus constituted "the
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English

liberty and the fundamental principle of law, that ever was found in an
English law book."5 0 The Boyd Court also referred to the principles
Gormley also quotes William Pitt the Elder's Speech on the Excise Bill:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It
may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow through it-the storm may enter,
the rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares not cross
the threshold of the ruined tenement!
Gormley, supra at 1358 (citing William Pitt, Speech on the Excise Bill, quoted in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,378-79 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing 15 HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY
HISTORY OF ENGLAND

(1753-1765) at 1307)).

45. Gormley, supra note 44, at 1359-60, (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF

THE AMERICAN UNION 299 (1st ed. 1868)).
46. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
47. Id. at 622.
48. Id. The Court also held that the search and seizure was unreasonable because it violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelling the defendant to be a witness
against himself. Id. at 634-35.
49. Id. at 625.

50. Id. (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 301-03
(5th ed. 1883)). James Otis made this pronouncement in 1761, during a famous debate which the
Boyd Court characterized as "perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country." Id.
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set forth in Lord Camden's judgment in Entick v. Carrington51 and
concluded that "[i]t is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal lib5' 2
erty and private property.
Writing for the Boyd majority, Justice Bradley stated that the
Fourth Amendment must be liberally construed and admonished the
courts against the dangers of a narrow construction. He said that
although an order to produce papers was "divested of many of the
aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure," it nonetheless
"contains their substance and essence, and effects their substantial
purpose. '5 3 Referring to the government's methods, he added:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated
by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security
of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and
literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound
than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. 54
Forty years later, in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,5 5 Justice
Brandeis wrote that Boyd "will be remembered as long as civil liberty
'5 6
lives in the United States."
In Olmstead, the Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment was implicated when government agents wiretapped the telephone conversations of persons suspected of violating the Prohibition
Act.5 7 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply. The majority concluded that there was no Fourth
Amendment search because the wiretapping did not involve a physical
51. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765). This celebrated English case was "fresh in the
memories of those who achieved our independence and established our form of government."
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625. The decision condemned the practice of issuing general warrants to
search houses and seize books that could be used in prosecutions for libel. Id
52. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
53. Id. at 635.
54. Id.
55. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
dissenting).
56. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J.,
57. Id. at 438. Federal prohibition officers inserted small wires along ordinary telephone
wires. The taps were made without trespass upon the defendants' property. Id at 457.
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trespass or an examination of tangible objects.58 The Court noted that
telephone users intentionally project their voices over wires outside
their houses, and held that Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to interceptions of voices outside the protected area of those
houses.59 Accordingly, in subsequent cases involving electronic eavesdropping, the Court's threshold test depended upon whether the
means for establishing the wiretap included, at the very least, minimal
physical penetration of a constitutionally protected building. 60
Justice Brandeis criticized Olmstead's narrow definition of a
search. He said that the Framers had protected the people from government violations of their "right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."'61 He warned
that "[t]he progress of science in furnishing the Government with
'62
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.

58. Id. at 464. "The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants." Id. The wiretap violated a
Washington State statute that made wiretapping a misdemeanor. Id. at 468-69. However, the
Court held that violation of a state law did not warrant exclusion of the evidence in a federal
case. Id. at 469.
59. Id. at 466.
60. See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
61. Olmstead, 227 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis stated:
It is ... immaterial where the physical connections with the telephone wires leading
into the defendant's premises was made. And it is also immaterial that the intrusion
was made in aid of law enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.
Id.
62. Id. at 474; see generally Gormley, supra note 44. The author discusses the right to privacy in the United States, one hundred years after Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren authored
their famous article on privacy law. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). While on the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis championed
the argument that both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments must be held to protect against the
government's unjustified use of new technologies. See, e.g, Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) ("Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means
far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet"). Gormley notes that Justice Brandeis, who was a son of Jewish immigrants
who fled Prague because of increasing government restrictions on liberty, "was clearly cognizant
of the dangers posed to racial and religious minorities if the government's intrusions into homes
and personal property were allowed to grow unchecked with each new piece of technology."
Gormley, supra note 44, at 1438.
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Thirty-nine years later, the Court overruled Olmstead in the
landmark decision of Katz v. United States. 63 In Katz, FBI agents attached a listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth.
The Court held that the agents had conducted a Fourth Amendment
search and seizure when they electronically listened to and recorded
the telephone conversation. 64 The Court reasoned that the individual
had shut the door of the telephone booth and paid the toll for a private phone conversation. 65 Consequently, the agents' actions violated
66
an expectation of privacy upon which the speaker justifiably relied.
Thus, the Court in Katz rejected the Olmstead inquiry. It stated
that a focus on protected physical "areas" deflected attention from the
issues.67 "The fact that the electronic device ... did not happen to
' 68
penetrate the wall . . . can have no constitutional significance. "

Concurring, Justice Harlan regarded the pre-Katz focus on physical
penetrations as "bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical
invasion"

'69

The Katz majority proclaimed:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in70 an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.
Justice Harlan attempted to clarify the majority's holding by advancing a two-part rule that could be applied without reference to "areas."'71 He proposed that Fourth Amendment protections apply
wherever a person "exhibit[s] an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy" 72 which "society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. '73
63. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see generally LAFAVE, supra note 5.
64. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. The Court also held that the search and seizure were unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant. Id. at 358.
65. Id. at 352.
66. Id. at 353.
67. Id. at 351.
68. Id. at 353.
69. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
70. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
71. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). "As the Court's opinion states, 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.' The question, however, is what protection it affords to those
people." Id.

72. Id. "Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited." Id.
73. Id. For example, "conversations in the open would not be protected against being over-

heard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable." Id

1994]

HOME INFRARED EMISSIONS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

817

These statements, from both the majority opinion and Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion, laid the foundation for virtually all modem
Fourth Amendment analysis.
Katz marked a second beginning for Fourth Amendment threshold analysis. 74 Like Boyd, Katz re-centered the Court's analysis upon
the invasion of a valuable privacy interest, rather than the physical
methods employed to effect that invasion. 75 Katz promised the people Fourth Amendment protection against arbitrary, electronic invasions of legitimate privacy interests.
However, Katz did not declare an absolute right to privacy. It
recognized that an individual may relinquish a privacy interest by inviting public observation. 76 This recognition required the Court to focus Fourth Amendment threshold review, at least in part, upon the
actions taken by the individual to preserve or defeat a justifiable expectation of privacy. Privacy interests could be assessed by analyzing
the subjective expectations of an individual, 77 in light of the objective
78
expectations of society.
Four years after Katz, Justice Harlan expounded upon his expectation of privacy rule in his dissenting opinion in United States v.
White.7 9 In White, a plurality applied the new Katz analysis in conjunction with a risk analysis. The plurality found that the government
may electronically monitor a telephone conversation when one party
consents to such electronic surveillance. 80 The plurality further found
that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy once an individual knowingly confides in another party. 81 When people assume
the risk of misplacing their confidence in another party, they no
longer have a justifiable expectation of privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment. 82
74. See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 4, at 662.
75. "Although Katz has become the basis for examining the parameters of the 'new' fourth
amendment, the privacy concept it enunciated had its roots deeply embedded in Boyd." Id.
Katz "firmly held that a privacy value-oriented analysis would supplant the traditional property

approach. The right of the individual to be left alone to live his daily life secure against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials appeared once again to become the basic value protected by
the fourth amendment." Id. at 663.
76. Id. at 672. "By focusing on the precautions that Katz took, the Court disclosed that it

might not believe in an 'entitlement theory,' a right of the people to expect their government to
respect their privacy." Id.at 664.
77. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.

78. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
79. 401 U.S. 745, 768-95 (1971) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).

80. Id.at 751-53 (plurality opinion).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Justice Harlan disagreed with the White plurality's application of
the Katz standard. It had erroneously hinged its inquiry entirely upon
an analysis of the risks assumed among private individuals. The plurality had failed to address the central concern of the Fourth Amendment, which is whether the government's conduct encroached upon
the privacy expectations of citizens in a free society. Citing Boyd, he
reminded the Court, "It matters little that consensual transmittals are
less obnoxious than wholly clandestine eavesdrops. ' 83 He said that
the threshold analysis must "transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that
84

translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present."
Judges should not "merely recite the expectations and risks." a In-

stead, the critical question for the Court is whether under our system
of government, reflected in the Constitution, the risk of an electronic

eavesdropper or observer should be imposed upon citizens without
Fourth Amendment protection. 86
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police .... [Ilf he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks
what doubt he has, the risk is his .... In terms of what his course will be, what he will
or will not do or say, we are unpersuaded that he would distinguish between probable
informers on the one hand and probable informers with transmitters on the other.
Id. at 752.
83. Id. at 789 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan pointed out that Boyd had rejected the
idea that Fourth Amendment protections depended upon the mitigating aspects of the government's conduct. Id The White decision had failed to heed Boyd's warning about the "'illegitimate and unconstitutional practices'" which may be "'divested of many of the aggravating
incidents of actual search and seizure, yet... contain[ ] their substance and essence, and effect[]
d. (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635).
their substantial purpose .
84. Id. at 786.
85. ld.

86. Id. Justice Douglas also wrote a vehement dissent. He expressed a profound concern
about the use of high technology in general, and remote sensing in particular, to intrude upon
and examine the citizens. He said:
The issue in this case is clouded and concealed by the very discussion of it in legalistic terms. What the ancients knew as "eavesdropping," we now call "electronic surveillance"; but to equate the two is to treat man's first gunpowder on the same level as
the nuclear bomb. Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever
known. How most forms of it can be held "reasonable" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment is a mystery. To be sure, the Constitution and Bill of Rights are
not to be read as covering only the technology known in the 18th century. Otherwise
its concept of "commerce" would be hopeless when it comes to the management of
modern affairs.
Id. at 756 (Douglas J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas further stated:
Today no one perhaps notices because only a small, obscure criminal is the victim. But
every person is the victim, for the technology we exalt today is everyman's master. Any
doubters should read Arthur R. Miller's The Assault On Privacy (1971). After describing the monitoring of conversations and their storage in data banks, Professor Miller
goes on to describe "human monitoring" which he calls the "ultimate step in mechanical snooping"-a device for spotting unorthodox or aberrational behavior across a wide
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The Modern Court's Threshold Analysis
1. Accessibility and Risk

Since Katz and White, the Court has considered various and pro-

gressively sophisticated government investigatory tactics in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The Court's decisions, and their
progeny in the lower courts, have shaped the contours of acceptable
government conduct toward criminal suspects and non-suspects alike,
and delineated society's "reasonable" expectations of privacy. Consistent with White, a highly divided Court has applied a strict risk analy-

sis to determine whether a protectible expectation of privacy has been
violated.

The modem Court defines a Fourth Amendment search as a government act that satisfies both prongs of the Katz two-prong analysis.

First, the Court looks to see whether a citizen has demonstrated a
subjective expectation of privacy. If there is no such demonstration,

the Fourth Amendment inquiry ends.
Individuals easily defeat their own claims to Fourth Amendment
privacy rights. By being a participant in modem society, individuals
often fail to demonstrate the requisite expectation of privacy. Anything "a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own

home or office," is generally viewed by the Court as an assumed risk,

'87
and therefore, "not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
An early example of this analysis occurred in Smith v. Maryland,88 where the Court found that by using telephones, individuals
knowingly expose the numbers they dial to the telephone company.
Consequently, the Court held that the government may, without justification or notice, enlist the cooperation of a telephone company to
electronically identify the telephone numbers dialed from a home
89
telephone.
spectrum. "Given the advancing state of both the remote sensing art and the capacity
of computers to handle an uninterrupted and synoptic data flow, there seem to be no
physical barriers left to shield us from intrusion."
Id. at 757 (quoting ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 46 (1971).
87. See supra text accompanying note 69.
88. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
89. Id. In Smith, the government used a pen register device which can mechanically monitor a private telephone's electrical impulses. They used the device to identify the telephone
numbers dialed from an individual's home.
Justice Marshall wrote in dissent, joined by Justice Brennan, that it was "idle to speak of
'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative." Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice. At least in
the third-party consensual surveillance cases, which first incorporated risk analysis into
Fourth Amendment doctrine, the defendant presumably had exercised some discretion
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The Smith majority acknowledged that in some cases it would
have to apply only a normative inquiry to determine whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists. 90 "[W]here an individual's subjective expectations had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to wellrecognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection was." 9 1
Where the Court recognizes that an individual has demonstrated
a subjective expectation of privacy, or the Court assumes so arguin deciding who should enjoy his confidential communications.... By contrast here,
unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or
professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance ...
Id. (citations omitted).
Permitting governmental access to telephone records on less than probable cause may
thus impede certain forms of political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the
hallmark of a truly free society. Particularly given the Government's previous reliance
on warrantless telephonic surveillance to trace reporters' sources and monitor protected political activity .... I am unwilling to insulate use of pen registers from independent judicial review.
Id. at 751; see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). In Miller the Court held that, by
entrusting personal financial information to a bank, an individual had no Fourth Amendment
protection against government scrutiny of bank records which contained that personal information. In contrast to the voluntary cooperation of the telephone company in Smith, the bank in
Miller provided the records in response to a subpoena. The bank maintained these records pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act. The Court held, "The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government ......
Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971)). The Court stated:
This analysis is not changed by the mandate of the Bank Secrecy Act that records
of depositors' transactions be maintained by banks.... [E]ven if the banks could be
said to have been acting solely as Government agents in transcribing the necessary
information and complying without protest with the requirements of the subpoenas,
there would be no intrusion upon the depositors' Fourth Amendment rights.
Id.
90. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 n.5.
For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television
that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter
might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes,
papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this
Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously monitoring his
telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the contents of
his calls might be lacking as well.
Id.
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the majority had not adequately defined the circumstances under which a normative inquiry would supplant the subjective inquiry. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[T]o make risk analysis dispositive in assessing the reasonableness of privacy expectations would allow the government to define the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. For example, law enforcement officials, simply by announcing their intent to
monitor the content of random samples of first-class mail or private phone conversations, could put the public on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume in such
communications.
Id. at 750 (citing Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 384, 407).
91. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
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endo,92 the Court considers the second prong of the analysis. An individual's expectation must be one that society is prepared to consider
reasonable.
The modem Court's second prong may be described as a Catch22 analysis. It acknowledges that "what [a person] seeks to protect as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. '93 However, the Court generally finds that society
would not consider it reasonable to expect privacy in anything that is
accessible to the public. Society's view of what can be reasonably expected as private is cast in light of what can be realistically, even cynically, expected to remain private. The Court rarely asks, except
rhetorically, whether the government's intrusion infringed upon societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, like
the first prong, Fourth Amendment claims are easily defeated by the
second prong.
In California v. Ciraolo,94 the Court considered whether police
violated a reasonable expectation of privacy when they flew a plane
over an individual's home to look at and photograph the backyard.
The private yard was hidden at ground level by a six-foot outer fence
and a ten-foot inner fence. The Court found that the individual had
demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy by surrounding the
property with fences. 95 It also stated that, under the Katz test, the
Court must consider "whether the government's intrusion infringes
upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment."

96

92. See, e.g, California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1986). While the defendant had
demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy from street-level observation, the Court found
that it was unclear whether the defendant expected privacy from aerial observation. Id.; see also
infra note 94.
93. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
94. 476 U.S. 207. The police received an anonymous tip that marijuana was growing in the
defendant's backyard. Id.at 209.
95. Id.at 211. "Clearly-and understandably-respondent has met the test of manifesting
his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits
....It can be reasonably assumed that the 10-foot fence was placed to conceal the marijuana
crop from at least street-level views." Id. However, continuing its analysis, the Court did not
conclude that this alone was sufficient to satisfy even the first prong of the Katz test.
Yet a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the eyes of a citizen or a
policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus. Whether respondent therefore manifested a subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of his backyard, or whether instead he manifested merely a hope that no one would observe his
unlawful gardening pursuits, is not entirely clear in these circumstances.
Id. at 211-12.
96. Id at 212 (citations omitted).
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Nonetheless, in a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the individual's
expectation of privacy did not pass the Katz test. The police had observed only what was in "plain view." 97 "Any member of the public
flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything
that these officers observed." 98 Therefore, in an age where private
and commercial flight is routine, it was not reasonable to expect that
the Constitution affords protection from aerial observation with the
naked eye.99
Four Justices in Ciraolo joined in a single dissenting opinion.
They said that the majority, without sufficient explanation, had
divested modern citizens of their longstanding Fourth Amendment
privacy interest in an enclosed curtilage, 100 simply because technology
had enabled the public to use airspace for travel. 01 They objected to
97. Id. at 215. The Court quoted Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz. Id.
98. lId at 213-14. The Court recognized that the officers had been investigating the curtilage next to the individual's home. The common law recognizes the curtilage as an area associated with the ."sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."' Id. at 212 (quoting Boyd, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and
personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened....
That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation. The
Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some
views of his activities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point
where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible.
Id. at 212-13.
99. Id. at 215. The Court stated:
One can reasonably doubt that in 1967 Justice Harlan considered an aircraft within
the category of future "electronic" developments that could stealthily intrude upon an
individual's privacy. In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants
were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling
in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is
visible to the naked eye.
Id.
100. The Court recently reaffirmed in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227
(1986), that the curtilage doctrine evolved to "protect much the same kind of privacy as that
covering the interior of a structure." The Court in Dow emphasizes, moreover, that society
accepts as reasonable citizens' expectations of privacy in the area immediately surrounding their
homes. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 220-21 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Ciraolo dissent noted:
The Court omits any reference to the fact that respondent's yard contained a swimming pool and a patio for sunbathing and other private activities. At the suppression
hearing, respondent sought to introduce evidence showing that he did use his yard for
domestic activities. The trial court refused to consider that evidence. ...
Id. at 222 n.7.
101. Had the officers climbed the fences, rather than flown overhead, to peer into the curtilage, they would have violated the Fourth Amendment's protections. Id. at 222 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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the finding that, by failing to build barriers over their property, people
knowingly expose their residences to the public. People may willingly
risk the remote possibility that private travelers will catch a fleeting,
anonymous glimpse of their property. However, it does not follow
purposeful surthat the people thereby willingly risk the10government's
2
veillance from the same vantage point.
The second prong of the Court's threshold analysis may be applied without regard to the laws that bear upon a frustration of privacy. In California v. Greenwood,10 3 the Court considered whether
the Fourth Amendment was applicable where government agents,
throughout a three month period, conducted a warrantless search and
seizure' 4 of garbage left for collection, in sealed opaque bags, on the
curb outside a home. The individuals had left the garbage on the
curbside pursuant to the commands of local laws regarding garbage
disposal. However, only the dissenting Justices considered these laws,
as well as other local laws, as factors.
The Greenwood majority reversed the California Superior
Court's decision' 0 5 and held that by exposing their garbage to the public the individuals defeated any Fourth Amendment claim. It concluded that society would not consider it reasonable to expect privacy
in the contents of a sealed trash bag because it is "common knowledge
that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public."' 6
The dissenting Justices in Greenwood considered the local laws to
be relevant to the question of privacy expectations. They objected to
a holding where, compelled by a government ordinance to dispose of
garbage in this manner, people forfeit all reasonable expectations of
The Court concludes, nevertheless, that [the officer] could use an airplane-a product
of modem technology-to intrude visually into respondent's yard. The Court argues
that respondent had no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observation.
Id
102. Id.at 223-24.
103. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
104. The Greenwood Court defined the issue before the Court as "whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside

the curtilage of a home." Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
105. The California Supreme Court had denied a petition for review. Id.at 39.
106. Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted). Thus, because of "common knowledge" regarding accessibility, the Court holds the Fourth Amendment does not apply. By its own language, the Court

at 37. Normally, this
acknowledges that the government performed a "warrantless search." Id.
should be enough to trigger the Fourth Amendment inquiry that follows the threshold test:
whether the government's conduct was reasonable. Yet, the Court instead focuses entirely upon
whether the individual's expectations were reasonable, and deciding that they were not, holds
the Fourth Amendment inapplicable.
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privacy.' 0 7 These Justices also noted that many municipalities make it
unlawful for anyone to move or otherwise interfere with articles left
on a public street for collection. 10 8 Furthermore, the state superior
court had held that the warrantless search of garbage violated its state
constitution. Nonetheless, the majority did not believe that the local
ordinances or state constitution indicated that society was prepared to
consider the individual's privacy expectation reasonable. 1' 9
Paradoxically, eight months after Greenwood, the plurality in
Florida v. Riley 10 found the legality of government conduct was central to its Fourth Amendment threshold analysis. The government,
looking for marijuana, and without probable cause, flew a helicopter
at 400 feet to peer through openings in the roof and walls of an individual's private greenhouse. The Court recognized that in contrast to
the plane in Ciraolo,the public may not often travel in low flying helicopters over residential property. However, the plurality held that the
107. "Greenwood can hardly be faulted for leaving trash on his curb when a county ordiand prohibited him from disposing of it in any other
nance commanded him to do so ....
way .... " Id. at 54-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
108. Id at 52-55. The dissent also noted that the majority had properly rejected the State's
attempt to distinguish garbage on a theory of abandonment. Id. at 51. But cf Jon E. Lemole,
Note, From Katz to Greenwood. Abandonment Gets Recycled from the Trash Pile-Can Our
Garbage Be Saved from the Court's Rummaging Hands?, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 581 (1991)
(arguing that the Court's reasoning represented a classic abandonment analysis).
109. The dissent noted that garbage contains intimate details about the lives of the people.
"[A]lmost every human activity ultimately manifests itself in waste products .... "
Smith v. State, 510 P. 2d 793, 798 (Alaska), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973). See
California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 320-321, n. 3 (1987) (WHITE, J., dissenting) (renowned archaeologist Emil Haury once said, "[i]f you want to know what is really going on in a community, look at its garbage") (quoted by W. Rathje, Archaeological
Ethnography... Because Sometimes It Is Better to Give Than to Receive, in Explorations in Ethnoarchaeology 49,54 (R. Gould ed. 1978)); Weberman, The Art of Garbage
Analysis: You Are What You Throw Away, 76 Esquire 113 (1971) (analyzing trash of
various celebrities and drawing conclusions about their private lives). A single bag of
trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and recreational habits of the person
who produced it....
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 50 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
The Court concluded that "snoops" defeat an expectation of privacy by making sole reference to the incident where a tabloid reporter examined Henry Kissinger's garbage and published
the findings. Id. at 41 n.4. The dissent found that this incident supported a contrary conclusion:
In evaluating the reasonableness of Greenwood's expectation that his sealed trash
bags would not be invaded, the Court has held that we must look to "understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society."... [However,] Kissinger was "really
revolted" by the intrusion and his wife suffered "grave anguish." N. Y. Times, July 9,
1975, p. Al, col. 8. The public response roundly condemning the reporter demonstrates
that society not only recognized those reactions as reasonable, but shared them as well.
Commentators variously characterized his conduct as "a disgusting invasion of personal
privacy," Flieger, Investigative Trash, U.S. News & World Report, July 28, 1975, p. 72
(editor's page); "indefensible ... as civilized behavior," Washington Post, July 10, 1975,
p. A18, col. 1 (editorial); and contrary to "the way decent people behave in relation to
each other." ibid.
Id. at 51-52
110. 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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unlikelihood of public observation from such a low altitude was not
dispositive of the Fourth Amendment search inquiry."'
Instead, the plurality said, "[ilt is of obvious importance that the
helicopter... was not violating the law"" 2 respecting legally navigable airspace. It expounded as a general proposition that "the police
may see what may be seen from a public vantage point where [they
have] a right to be.""113 In dissent, three Justices observed that the

plurality's "exceedingly grudging Fourth Amendment theory" now almember of
lows an expectation of privacy to be defeated if a single
4
the public could conceivably see into the area legally."
The Riley plurality also introduced new factors into the threshold
analysis. It noted that "no intimate details connected with the use of
the home or curtilage were observed, and there was no undue noise,
and no wind, dust, or threat of injury." 115 The Court held that, under
these circumstances, there was no violation of the Fourth
16

Amendment.
The Riley dissenters raised questions about these new factors,
which to date remain unanswered by the Court. They questioned
what the plurality meant by its reference to "intimate details," calling
this the "most remarkable passage in the plurality opinion.""n 7 They

asked, "Where in the Fourth Amendment or in our cases is there any
must be
warrant for imposing a requirement that the activity observed
8
Constitution?""1
the
by
protected
be
to
'intimate' in order
111. Id. at 450-51. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor disagreed with this conclusion.
"[Tihe relevant inquiry... is not whether the helicopter was where it had a right to be under
FAA regulations." Id. at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Instead, the inquiry is whether the
helicopter was where "members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that Riley's expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not. .. 'reasonable."' Id.
Justice O'Connor concurred with the plurality opinion because there was "reason to believe
that there [was] considerable use of the airspace ... and because [the defendant] introduced no
evidence to the contrary." Id. at 455. In her view, the defendant had the burden of proving that
an expectation of privacy was reasonable. It
See David J. Stewart, Florida v. Riley: The Emerging Standardfor Aerial Surveillance of the
Curtilage, 43 VAND. L. REV. 275 (1990) (discussing the view that the "frequency" of aerial flight
serves as a gauge for measuring the reasonableness of privacy expectations from aerial
observation).
112. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451-52.
113. Id. at 449 (citation omitted).
114. ld. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Riley, 488 U.S. at 452.
116. Id.
117. I& at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "If the police had observed Riley embracing his
wife in the backyard greenhouse, would we then say that his reasonable expectation of privacy
had been infringed?" Id.
118. Id. Put another way, would the Court now hold that Fourth Amendment rights will be
protected only where a citizen has evidence that a search revealed intimate information?
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The dissenters also found it puzzling that the plurality should find
noise, wind, and dust as measures for Fourth Amendment violations. 119 Such factors did not seem relevant where "'[tihe basic purpose of . . . [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless

decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of indi' 120
viduals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." "
2. Accessibility and the Risk of Sense-Enhanced Observation
The underlying question in the lower courts' FLIR cases is
whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated when this senseenhancing device, operated entirely beyond the curtilage of private
buildings, is used to access information regarding activities within
those buildings. Yet, the Supreme Court has not settled how, or to
what extent, sense-enhanced investigatory methods affect the modern
21
Fourth Amendment threshold analysis.'
The Ciraolo Court mentioned that the government agents inspected only what they could see with the "naked eye.' 22 However,
it is not clear how important this factor was in the Court's analysis. In
United States v. Place, 23 the Court stated in dicta that government
agents may supplement their senses, without constituting a Fourth
Amendment search, by using a narcotics detection dog to detect the
concealed contents of an individual's container. 24 The Court stated
that this limited disclosure "ensures that the owner of the property is
not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods.' 125 However,
119. Id. at 462. Noting that the FAA does not impose a minimum altitude requirement for
helicopters, the Justices questioned whether the plurality would apply the same reasoning to
governmental use of a silent, non-disruptive, low-flying helicopter to discover what the individuals were reading or who their guests were, or to peer into a room of the house viewable only

from the air. Id. at 462-63.
120.
121.
L. REV.
122.

Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
See generally David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MlrN.
563 (1990).
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. "'The observations by [the officers] took place within public

navigable airspace.... [F]rom this point they were able to observe plants readily discernible to
the naked eye as marijuana." Id.
123. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).

124. The analysis of the canine sniff was unnecessary to the Court's decision, since the deconcurring) (citing United States v.
fendant did not contest its validity. Id. at 719 (Brennan, J.,
Place, 498 F.Supp. 1217, 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)).
125. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. The defendant probably finds little solace in being spared this

embarrassment and inconvenience. There was no probable cause for a search in this case. Id. at
706. Without probable cause, the defendant had Fourth Amendment protection against "less
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods."
Also, an individual subjected to a canine sniff may find it more intrusive than other investigative methods. See Loewy supra note 11, at 1246-47. "[T]he very act of being subjected to a
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the Court has not articulated whether or how this principle may apply
to other sense-enhanced surveillance techniques.
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,126 the Court held that
there was no Fourth Amendment search when the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) used sense-enhanced technology to investigate a 2,000-acre commercial chemical facility. The EPA used a standard precision aerial mapping camera to photograph the facility from
altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet. 127 The camera was valued at
more than $20,000 and the photographs revealed details 1/2 inch in
diameter.'2
The Dow Chemical Court stated that the photographs "undoubtedly give EPA more detailed information than naked-eye views. '1 29
However, "[t]he mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat
...does not give rise to constitutional problems."' 30 The Court reasoned, in part, that the photographs only revealed the outline of the
facility's buildings and equipment and did not show intimate details
that would raise constitutional concerns.' 31 "An electronic device to
penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions of chemical formulae or other trade secrets would raise very
different and far more serious questions."' 132
The Court also found it significant that the government had used
a "conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera" rather than a
"unique sensory device."'1 33 The Court did not explain the signifibody sniff by a German Shepard may be offensive at best or harrowing at worst to the innocent
sniffee." Id
126. 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (decided the same day as California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)).
127. Id. at 229.
128. Id at 243, 243 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. Id at 238.
130. Id
131. Id at 238. Although power lines as small 1/2 inch in diameter where observed, "those
power lines are observable only because of their stark contrast with the snow-white background." Id at 239 n.5. No other small objects, "such as a class ring, for example, are recognizable, nor are there any identifiable human faces or secret documents captured in such a fashion as
to implicate more serious privacy concerns. Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on the
facts of each case, not by extravagant generalizations." Id "'[W]e have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984).
132. Id. at 239. Although the device used by the government did not capture confidential
discussions, Dow claimed that photographs, which show the design and configuration of Dow's
equipment, reveal details of secret manufacturing processes. Id. at 240. (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
133. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238. In their partial dissenting opinion, four Justices argued
that this analysis contradicted Katz and threatened future privacy rights in the wake of increasingly available technology.
[A]s the Court states, the surveillance was accomplished by using 'a conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used in map-making.' These observations
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cance. However, it can be inferred that legitimate expectations of privacy may be diminished where the government employs a device that
is generally available to the public. Thus, the Court stated in dicta, "It
may well be, as the government concedes, that surveillance of private
property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not
generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."' 134
The decision in Dow Chemical, however, does not dispose of the
question of whether the government could use similar senseenhancing technology to inspect a private home and curtilage without
implicating the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that Dow's vast
industrial complex was more comparable to an "open field"' 135 than
the curtilage of a residence. The Court said, "We find it important
that [the Dow facility] is not an area immediately adjacent to a private
1 36
home, where privacy expectations are most heightened."'
In United States v. Knotts,137 the Court found there was no Fourth
Amendment search when government agents enhanced their senses
by attaching a "beeper"' 138 to an object, and remotely monitored the
shed no light on the antecedent question whether Dow had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Katz measures Fourth Amendment rights by reference to the privacy interests
that a free society recognizes as reasonable, not by reference to the method of surveillance used in the particular case. If the Court's observations were to become the basis
of a new Fourth Amendment standard that would replace the rule in Katz, privacy
rights would be seriously at risk as technological advances become generally disseminated and available in our society.
Id. at 251 (citations omitted) (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
134. Id. at 238.
135. Id. at 235-37. Fourth Amendment protections regarding the curtilage surrounding a
home do not extend to open areas beyond the curtilage. The Court's "open fields" doctrine
states that "an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities out of doors in
fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home." Id at 235-36 (quoting Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)).
136. Id. at 237 n.4. Four Justices, dissenting in part, recognized that the offensiveness "of the
general warrant and writ of assistance, so despised by the Framers of the Constitution, 'was
acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were inspected'
under their authority." Id. at 245 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978)). "Against that history, 'it is untenable that
the ban on warrantless searches was not intended to shield places of business as well as of residence."' Id. (quoting Marshall, 436 U.S. at 312).
The dissenting justices noted that the Dow Chemical Company appeared to have done
everything feasible to protect its confidential business information. During each of the ten years
preceding the litigation, the company spent at least $3,250,000 on security for the facility. This
included procedures against aerial surveillance. Regularly, Dov watched for suspicious overflights, worked with the State Police and local airports to identify pilots who may have photographed the facility, and through requests and litigation, retrieved any photographs actually
taken. Id. at 241-42.
137. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
138. A beeper is a radio transmitter that emits signals that can be monitored by a radio
receiver. Id. at 277.
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object while it was transported in a vehicle. "Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibit[s] the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science
and technology afforded them in this case.' 39 However, the Court
stressed that, since the vehicle could have also been tracked by visual
surveillance, "scientific enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also raise." 40
Accordingly, in United States v. Karo,14' the Court held that the
government had conducted a search when its agents remotely monitored a beeper, attached to an object, while it was located, out of sight,
within houses.' 42 The court stated that private residences are places in
which Fourth Amendment protections normally apply, and this protection extends to where "the Government surreptitiously employs an
electronic device to obtain information that it could not have obtained
by observation from outside the curtilage of the house."'1 43 However,
this does not resolve whether the government agents may enhance
their senses from beyond the curtilage to observe the contents of the
home. 1'
3. Expanding Access, Expanding Risks
Applying the modern Court's threshold analysis, many lower
courts have expanded the classes of government surveillance tech145
niques that fall outside the Fourth Amendment search threshold.
For example, lower courts have held that the government may listen
139. Id.at 282. The Court cited United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927), which held
that using a searchlight to augment the senses did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282-83.

Three Justices did not join in the Court's opinion because of the majority's "unnecessarily
broad dicta ... [which] may prove confusing to courts that must apply this decision in the fu-

ture." Knotts, 460 U.S. at 288 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). "Although the augmentation in this case,
was unobjectionable, it by no means follows that the use of electronic detection techniques does

not implicate especially sensitive concerns." Id.
140. Knots, 460 U.S. at 285.
141. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
142. Although the government used its observation in a warrant affidavit, the Court held
that this did not invalidate the warrant. Id. at 721. There was other information which was
sufficiently untainted to provide probable cause to support the warrant. Id.
143. Id. at 715. It is "less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact

about the interior of the premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and
that it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant." Id.

144. For an in-depth analysis and comparison of Knotts and Karo, see Clifford S. Fishman,
Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo, and the Questions Still
Unanswered, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 277 (1985).

145. For an overview of lower court decisions regarding sense-enhanced searches accomplished with telescopes, binoculars, and fluorescent powder, see Steinberg, supra note 121, at
605-12. "The lack of guidance provided by the[ ] [Supreme] Court opinions has ...
conclusory and conflicting lower court decisions." Id. at 612.

generated
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to personal telephone calls made with cordless phones, even when
neither party to the conversation has consented to the surveillance. 146
Despite the factual similarity to Katz, these decisions reason that people should know that cordless phone technology is easily intercepted,
beyond the curtilage, by private third parties. Thus, people who use
cordless telephones voluntarily assume the risk of exposing their communications to government surveillance. 147
Expanding upon the holding in Greenwood, one circuit court recently held that the IRS did not violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy when it systematically pieced together shredded documents
that an individual left outside his home for trash removal. 148 The
court characterized the circumstances as "a failed attempt at secrecy
by reason of underestimation of police resourcefulness," and stated
that "[tihere is no constitutional protection from police scrutiny as to
information received from a failed attempt at secrecy."'149 This statement illustrates how far Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has diverged from the holdings and spirit expressed in Boyd and Katz.
Jurisprudence that holds that the Constitution does not apply to
"failed attempt[s] at secrecy" is especially alarming in the "Information Age."'150 Precious little information is, or can be, entirely concealed. Increasingly, the computer and natural sciences make it
possible to gain access to and derive information from what were previously unintelligible or non-existent sources.' 5' Perhaps nowhere is
146. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1620 (1993); Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990);

United States v. Carr, 805 F. Supp. 1266 (E.D.N.C. 1992).147. See, e.g., Carr, 805 F. Supp. at 1276. The court analogized the use of a cordless phone,

which emanates radio waves outside the home, to a shout, which can be overheard by outsiders.
ld. It also stated, "[T]he Government did not plant a bug or beeper inside the [defendant's]
apartment; it did nothing to cause information about the goings-on inside the apartment to be
transmitted outside the apartment. Rather it passively (albeit intentionally) received information being broadcast to anyone within range who was utilizing compatible equipment." ld. This
is remarkably reminiscent of the Olmstead reasoning which was later discredited by Katz. See
supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
148. United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1877 (1993).
149. Id. at 930.
150. See generally Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133 (1991) (discussing the proliferation of personal information
in the private and public sectors, and the need to recognize a constitutional right to informational privacy).
151. More than twenty years ago, Arthur Miller wrote that "there are precious few things
left in life that will not leave distinctive electronic tracks in the memory of the computer-tracks
that can tell a great deal about our activities, habits, and associations." MILLER, supra note 86,
at 54; see generally Charles Piller, Privacy in Peril; How Computers Are Making Private Life a
Thing of the Past, THE RECORDER, July 19, 1993, (Commentary; Technology and the Law), available in LEXIS, Nexis NEWS Library, RECRDR File, at *6. The article quotes Gary Marx, a
privacy expert at the University of Colorado:
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this trend more evident than in the emerging capabilities and extensive use of remote sensing systems.' 5 2 Operating from remote locations, these systems derive, record, and analyze meaningful
information from the otherwise imperceptible energies given off by all
53
substances.

III.

THE NEED TO REORIENT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
THRESHOLD ANALYSIS

A.

The Misapplication of Katz: Measuring Expectations
With a Shifting Gauge

The modem Court's Fourth Amendment threshold analysis has
not produced a coherent or effective approach to "protecting people,
55
[rather than] places"' 154 from advancing surveillance techniques.
The Court continues to cite Katz as the foundation for its analysis.
However, the modem analysis is antithetical to Katz. Despite rhetoric
to the contrary, the Court generally finds that government agents may
intrude upon the private lives of Americans, so long as they do so
without making non-consensual physical intrusions. 5 6 Contrary to
the promise of Katz, the Court is essentially surrendering constitutional protections to modern science and invention.
The modern Court misapplies Katz. Within the context of this
Fourth Amendment analysis, expectations of privacy cannot be measured without gauging the expectations with the Constitution itself.
Constitutionally protected expectations must reflect the values inherent in our system of government and guaranteed through constituAs technology becomes ever more penetrating and intrusive, it becomes possible to
gather information with laserlike specificity and spongelike absorbency ....
Informa-

tion leakage becomes rampant; indeed, it is hemorrhaging. Barriers and boundariesbe they distance, darkness, time, walls, windows, even skin-that have been fundamental to our conceptions of privacy, liberty and individuality give way. Actions, feelings,

thoughts, acts, even futures are increasingly visible.
Id. at *1.
152. See e.g. supra note 86.
153. See supra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
154. See supra text accompanying note 70.
155. Most commentators have recognized that the Fourth Amendment doctrine is "in a state
of theoretical chaos that belies its supposed objective legitamation of governmental intrusions
into our 'private affairs."' Donald R. C. Pongrace, A Symposium of CriticalLegal Study: Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment's Public/PrivateDistinction:An Opportunity for Clarity,
34 AM. U. L. REv. 1191, 1208 (1985).
156. "It is axiomatic that the Court in Katz freed the Fourth Amendment from the narrow

confines of property law. Fishman, supra note 144, at 306 n.117. But Katz is the only case in
which the Court has held that a search or seizure occurred without a physical seizure of or

intrusion into, a suspect's person or property. Id.
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tional constraints. 157 Thus, the Smith Court noted, "[W]here an
individual's subjective expectations had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those
subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in as58
certaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was."'1
However, the modem Court instead gauges "reasonable" expectations of privacy with the frustrations of privacy borne in the private
sector of society. Furthermore, the Court's gauge is set to those frustrations that are suffered because of invasive conduct which is obtrusive and, in some cases, illegal and tortious. 159
Generally, the Court holds that personal information or objects
that may be accessible to the public at large, or may be accessible to a
third party in particular, lay beyond the threshold of the Fourth
Amendment. 60 The Court has not made exceptions where individuals cannot prevent or control this access, or where the access is accomplished by violations of local law. The result is that compelled
frustrations of privacy among individuals destroy constitutional limits
on government conduct.
In some opinions, privacy expectations have been gauged in relation to the likelihood of observation by non-government individuals
or organizations. Thus, privacy expectations may be diminished
where, for example, aerial observations are carried out from welltravelled airspace, 16' or accomplished with commonly available or inexpensive observation equipment. 62 However, in modern times, the
likelihood that private parties will use a particular technology increases constantly and rapidly. Public availability of technology,
whether measured according to the frequency of commercial use

157. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
158. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979) (emphasis added).
159. See generally Michael Campbell, Comment, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search. A
Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191 (1986). The
author proposes that the Court should instead gauge Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy
with generally accepted social norms of privacy among citizens. I& at 194.
160. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a FourthAmendment for the Twenty-First Century,
65 IND. L.J. 549, 564 (1990). The modem Court has transformed Katz's "knowing exposure"
rationale into "a roadblock to fourth amendment protection instead of a roadmap for ensuring
it." Id. Each limited disclosure of information results in the complete loss of protection in that
information. Id.
161. See supra note 111; see also Stewart, supra note 111, at 291-92.
162. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 106 and accompanying
text (discussing Greenwood's "common knowledge" analysis).
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or according to the purchase price, provides a highly transient
3

measure.16

In the Information Age, the people's ability to secure their privacy is quickly becoming less determined by subjective intentions and
societal values, and more controlled by the use of emerging technologies. 16 4 A Fourth Amendment analysis that stops short at the threshold, where individuals fail to control the uncontrollable exposure of
personal information, affords no protection to the citizens of a techno165
logically advanced nation.
Thus, ironically, as the people become less able to personally secure their own privacy interests from violations, they concurrently lose
constitutional protection to secure them against such violations. If the
progress of science and the Court's analysis are taken to their ultimate, logical conclusion, the Fourth Amendment could be virtually
reduced to a quaint remnant of early American society and political
theory.' 66
163. See, e.g., supra note 133; see also Washington v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (Wash. 1994).
The Young court stated:
We believe our legal right to privacy should reflect thoughtful and purposeful
choices rather than simply mirror the current state of the commercial technology industry. At the same time, a privacy right that is defined by a particular level of technological sophistication is administratively unworkable. Governmental agents could not be
certain at what point a warrant is required.
Id.
164. See, e.g., Piller supra note 151.
The public views these developments with growing alarm. In a 1992 poll conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, 78 percent of Americans expressed concern
about their personal privacy, up from about a third of those polled in 1970, and up from
64 percent in 1978. Perceived threats to personal privacy from computers rose from 38
percent in 1974 to 68 percent last year.
In a 1991 Time/CNN poll, 93 percent of respondents asserted that companies that
sell personal data should be required to ask permission from individuals in advance.
The 1990 census showed the highest rates of non-cooperation ever-the result of fears
that participation could place personal information in jeopardy, contend some privacy
advocates. And California's Privacy Rights Clearinghouse-the first privacy hotline in
the nation-logged more than 5,400 calls within three months of its inception last
November.
Id. at *1-2.
165. See, e.g., Katz, supranote 160, at 573-75. "[I]n the end we will transform the nation ...
into a society where ... [individual] freedoms are as fragile as the official self-restraint upon
which their continued existence now totally depends." Id. at 575.
166. See supra note 133; see also Gutterman, supra note 4, at 720. "The Court has become
embroiled in a semantic mesh of its own choosing by departing from 'the spirit as well as the
letter of the Fourth Amendment,' and such departure may well 'sweep all our traditions into the
fire."' Id. (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. American Tobacco Co. 264 U.S. 298, 305-06
(1924)).
The Court should 'reject the Orwellian notion that precious liberties derived from the
Framers simply shrink as the government acquires new means of infringing them.' In
our times of ever-increasing and potentially unlimited technology, the judiciary must
make the government aware that it does not possess carte blanche authority to keep
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Remote Sensing and the Shifting Gauge

In Dow Chemical, the Court suggested that government use of
highly sophisticated surveillance equipment, such as satellite technology, which is not generally available to the public, might constitute a
"search" and thus require a warrant. However, to conclude that the
Fourth Amendment protects the people from unwarranted satellite
surveillance, the Court will not be able to rely on the continuously

shifting gauge of public availability.
Some satellite remote sensing technology is already being used
for private commercial purposes. 167 And in March 1994, the Clinton
Administration announced a new policy that would ease marketing
restrictions on United States' espionage satellite imaging technology. 168 This policy would enable United States' businesses to build
and operate the technology, and market it to commercial and government customers worldwide.169

The Administration's policy includes provisions to ensure that the
government maintains the capability to access information from satellite imaging jobs. The policy would require customers to maintain
records of the job instructions carried out by the satellite. 170 It would
also forbid the use of encryption devices that are capable of under-

mining government access to the satellite data.' 71 Such devices are
standard security controls that employ encryption techniques to pre172
vent unauthorized access to information.
watch over its citizens or their businesses. To remove the judiciary as a restraining
influence in this process is totally unwise.
ld. at 720-21 (quoting People v. Cook, 710 P.2d 299, 305 (Ca. 1985)).
167. See, e.g, Peter Bond, All the Better to See You With; Somewhere Up There, Something is
Watching... Peter Bond Looks at the Explosion of Flying Eyes, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 20,
1993, (Science Page), available in LEXIS, Nexis NEWS Library, INDPNT File, at *15. The
commercial market for satellites and satellite data grew about 20 percent a year during the previous three years. Id. at *1. "By the time the multinational Earth Observing System is deployed
after 1998, when remote sensing satellites will be sending back the equivalent of 20 million 500page books each week, the term 'invasion of privacy' will take on a whole new meaning." Id. at
*3.

168. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 29.
169. Id; see also U.S. Sets New Policy to Expand Exports of Remote Sensing Technology,
BNA WASH. INSIDER, Mar. 11, 1994, Export Controls, available in LEXIS, Nexis BNA Library,
BNAWI File. Remote sensing from space provides military, civil governmental, scientific, industrial, and individual users with the ability to gather data for various purposes. Id. at *1. "The
U.S. government operates extremely high-resolution space-based reconnaissance systems for intelligence gathering and military purposes, and many other countries have now discovered the
value of these satellites and are developing their own capabilities or are seeking to purchase data
or systems from foreign countries .... " Id. at *2.
170. Andrews, supra note 29, at C5.
171. Id.
172. See generally Communications,Administration's Encryption Initiative Not Welcomed By
Industry, BNA DAILY REP. FOR ExEcurvEs, Aug. 16, 1993, (Analysis and Reports), available in
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In sum, the Administration's policy removes many restraints that
once limited private access to satellite information, while also ensuring that government law enforcement agents will not face technological security barriers for accessing the privately developed information.
Thus, only legal constraints will be able to restrain government access.
It may not be long before the courts are asked to decide whether the
private availability of satellite data determines the people's reasonable expectations with regard to government inspections of that data.
In the meantime, the lower courts are considering whether the
Fourth Amendment protects the people from aerial and ground-based
remote sensing surveillance, accomplished with thermal infrared
imaging systems, to inspect privately owned buildings. 173 Like satellite technology, FLIR technology is widely used for commercial and
government applications, and its technological development and us174
age is rapidly escalating.
LEXIS, Nexis NEWS Library, DREXEC File. Encryption devices are widely used by companies in financial, insurance, and other industries for secure electronic data transfer. Id. at *1. In
April 1993, the Clinton Administration announced the "Clipper Chip" telecommunications initiative which would create a new standard for encryption, using a microprocessor developed by
the National Security Agency and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Id.;
see
also Mary E. Thufault et al., The Data Security Furor, INFo. WK., Feb. 14, 1994, at 12. This
article describes the heated debate over the Clinton Administration's proposed "Clipper Chip"
standard, which can scramble the electronic transmission of a conversation or document so that
"it can be deciphered only by the intended recipient-and the government." Id. at 12. "Big
Brother is watching, but he's not satisfied with the view." Id.
173. A holding that the FLIR inspection of a home does not implicate the Fourth Amendment may support a later holding that similar satellite technology is also permitted. Lisa Steele,
Comment, A View from on High. Satellite Remote Sensing Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 317, 318 (1991).
174. See, e.g., FL1R Systems Reports Record FinancialResults for 1993; Revenue Increases
23.2%; Net Income Up 472%, PR NEwswire, Feb. 10, 1994 (Financial News), available in
LEXIS, Nexis NEWS Library, PRNEWS File. FLIR Systems, Inc. is a major FLIR-market participant that designs, manufactures, and markets thermal infrared imaging systems worldwide.
Id. at *1.
Night vision applications include public safety (law enforcement and drug interdiction;
search and rescue; border and maritime patrol; and environmental protection) and defense (surveillance, reconnaissance, and navigation assistance). Industrial applications
include predictive and preventive maintenance; non-destructive testing and evaluation;
research and development; and manufacturing process control and monitoring.
Id. at *1-2.
FLIR Systems, Inc. reported that 1993 revenues from the sale of its industrial infrared imaging systems increased 36% from 1992, to $7.4 million. Revenues in 1993 from the sale of night
vision systems and sensors increased 20.5% from 1992, to a record $31.0 million. Id. at *1; see
also Stanley W. Kandebo, Cypher Moves Toward Autonomous Flight, 140 AVATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Mar. 7, 1994, at 42. Sikorsky Aircraft is equipping its experimental unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV), named Cypher, with cameras, FLIRs, and other sensors. Cypher is a small
donut-shaped UAV which is 6.5 feet in diameter, and uses a closed-rotor system. It can operate
at an altitude up to 8,000 feet, and, because of its closed-rotor system, it has been flown in
confined areas covered with trees and shrubs. Id. at 42, 44. The Cypher is being designed for
both commercial and government applications. Id. at 42.
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For example, FLIR technology will be augmented as part of the
United States Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects
Agency's (ARPA) Technology Reinvestment Project. 175 This project
supports "dual use" technologies that link commercial industrial
needs with defense needs. 176 As part of this project, ARPA has
awarded a grant to a business-government consortium,' 77 consisting of
aerospace electronics companies, commercial airlines, and government agencies, to develop an Autonomous Landing Guidance (ALG)
system for commercial and military aircraft.' 78 The system will integrate Forward Looking Infrared Radar with millimeter-wave radar
179
and information from the satellite-based Global Positioning System.
C.

An Orwellian Vision

The implication of advanced remote sensing systems, as well as
computer-based surveillance methods in general are staggering, and
difficult for the newly initiated to conceptualize. Thus, many writers
and dissenting Justices have drawn upon descriptive passages from
George Orwell's 1984 to articulate the frightening vision. 18° The capa175. See, e.g., FL1R Systems Inc. Part of Team Awarded $42.0 Million Federal Grantfor Development of Next-GenerationAircraft Landing System, PR Newswire, March 2, 1994, (Financial
News), availablein LEXIS, Nexis NEWS Library, PRNEWS File.
176. Id. at *1.
177. The consortium is led by Lear Astronics Inc. of Santa Monica, Ca., and includes FLIR
Systems Inc., Portland; United Airlines, Chicago; Northwest Airlines, Minneapolis; Interstate
Electronics Inc., Anaheim, Ca.; Malibu Research Inc., Calabasas, Ca.; Norton Plastics Inc., Ravenna, Ohio; the U.S. Air Force Right Dynamics Laboratory in Dayton, Ohio, and the Rome
Air Development Laboratory in Rome, N.Y.; the U.S. Army Communications and Electronics
Command in Ft. Monmouth, N.J.; NASA's Ames Research Center at Moffett Field, Ca., and
Langley Research Center in Langley, Va.; and the University of Maryland's Advanced Development Laboratory in Greenbelt, Md. Idt at *1-2.
178. Id. at *1. This ALG system will "enable commercial and military pilots to conduct
'clear-day' flight operations, including taxi, take-off, and landing, during conditions of extremely
low visibility, such as in inclement weather, dense fog, smoke or haze, or during combat situations." Id.
179. Id.
180. In his dissent in Florida v. Riley, Justice Brennan wrote:
I hope it will be a matter of concern to my colleagues that the police surveillance methods they would sanction were among those described forty years ago in George
Orwell's dread vision of life in the 1980's:
"The black-mustachio'd face gazed down from every commanding corner. There
was one on the house front immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING
YOU, the caption said .... In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the
roofs, hovered for an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving
flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people's windows."
488 U.S. 445, 466 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN
EIGTrY-FoUR 4 (1949)). See also Gutterman, supra note 4, at 649, Katz, supra note 160, at 562,
and Steele, supra note 173, at 1, all quoting from the following passage:
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given
moment .... It was even conceivable they watched everybody all the time .... You had
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bility of integrated computer-based technology to quickly locate, identify, aggregate, correlate, interpret, and then project information is
seemingly unlimited. However, the true extent of the government's
capabilities are unknown because they are withheld from the public. 181 The technology continues to advance rapidly. 182 Regardless of
what today's limitations may be, such limitations may represent only
technological challenges that time and effort will overcome.
The development and uncontrolled use of such technology is exceptionally pertinent to the Fourth Amendment threshold analysis.
There is a clear parallel to the arbitrary rummaging that government
to five-did live, from habit that became instinct-in the assumption that every sound
you made was overheard, and ... every movement scrutinized.
ORWELL, supra, at 4.
181. See, e.g., NEW TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 11, at 9-16.

In the last two decades, advances in imaging technology, remote sensing, telecommunications, computers, and related technologies have greatly increased the capability
for surveillance of people and their activities. Electronic surveillance includes both
sensing techniques and techniques for aggregating and comparing computerized
records to reveal additional information about an individual.
Id. at 12.
Sensing techniques-involving sight and photography, sound and tapping or taping,
and a variety of biological sensors-are increasingly powerful, able to operate at great
distances, miniaturized and easy to conceal, and otherwise undetectable to the subject.
In the form of data aggregation, storage, and processing systems, information technology allows local jurisdictions to cooperate, decreasing their dependence on national law
enforcement agencies. But it also creates records that are persistent and widely shared,
and difficult for the subject to know about, to access, to verify, or to correct.
Id. at 9.
The Offices of Technology Assessment, OTA, lists some of the electronic surveillance technologies used domestically, noting that the information was obtained in 1985 via a Federal
Agency Data Request to all major components within the 13 cabinet-level agencies and to 20
independent federal agencies. Id. at 13 n.5. However, OTA further notes that this data request
excluded the Defense Department's Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Administration because the results were to be unclassified. Id.; see also Holton, supra note 39. The
market for photonic technologies "maintains a large measure of secrecy, which springs both
from competition among companies and the desire of law enforcement agencies not to let the
bad guys know what hit them." Id. at 53.
Law enforcement agents are gluttons for data-the more and the faster, the better.
As image-gathering capabilities have dramatically improved, the ability to manipulate
and present the image data in a comprehensible form has also improved. The resulting
value for law enforcement will only continue to improve if data gathered from multiple
sources can be fused to create a coherent, in-depth picture of an area under surveillance. And this information must be rapidly transmitted to a command center.
Id. at 54-55.
As Donald Hutchinson, the director of sales and marketing for TAU Corporation, which are
the developers of the prototype HAWK system, has noted: "Tactical reconnaissance will be very
big in the 1990s. With sensors getting cheaper and smaller, the greatest expense is now in buying
and operating the aircraft. As smaller, less expensive planes become available, tactical recon will
be viable for more law enforcement agencies." Id. at 55. The Hawk system "essentially turns a
small plane into a flying workstation that controls and exploits multiple imaging sensors." Id.
182. See, e.g., General Sullivan Statement, supra note 30. "The pace of technological change
has far outstripped the Cold War pace of weapons and equipment development." Id. at 171.
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agents conducted throughout colonial homes.' 8 3 The primary distinction between advanced surveillance and colonial intrusions is that the
latter was comparatively primitive and inefficient, constrained by the
severe limitations inherent in physical human capability.
In contrast, computer-based surveillance can be conducted by
electronically casting the net wide, and allowing the technology to
panoramically scan a great expanse, locating and continually monitoring the objects or information of interest. This is arguably more intrusive than physical rummaging because it can be performed without the
subjects of investigation perceiving the electronic activity and without
knowing what information is being discovered, recorded, and
processed. 184
It is stunning to think that such operations may not be labeled a
"search" of the people and their property, and consequently, that the
constitutional right to be secure from unreasonable searches provides
no protection. If the Court so holds, the judiciary will not even reach
the inquiry, which lays beyond the threshold question, of whether
such operations are reasonable. The result would be that a warrant,
authorizing a physical entry into a house, would effectively become
only a warrant to seize-an inspection of the home would have been
completed before the warrant was issued and the entry made.
D. Defining a Search
Understandably, the Court struggles with a difficult analysis when
it seeks to formulate a Fourth Amendment "search" without referring
to the easily recognizable physical attributes of more traditional
search techniques. However, the Court faced the same challenge
more than 100 years ago when it first analyzed the threshold in Boyd.
Boyd held that the government could not skirt Fourth Amendment
restrictions by simply changing the methods used to intrude upon the
183. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 121, at 574-83. David Steinberg argues that senseenhanced searches reveal broad and unfocused information contrary to the Fourth Amend-

ment's particularity clause. Id He recommends that sense-enhanced searches be subject to the
warrant requirement, based on the balancing of three factors: 1) the specificity of the information revealed; 2) the limited duration of the search; and 3) the extent to which the search requires focus on a particular individual. Id. at 613.
184. See, e.g., id. at 569-74. The secrecy of the search chills free expression because lawabiding citizens may constantly fear government surveillance. Id. at 570-71. It also encourages
improper police conduct because the individual and the community may never learn when
searches occur. Thus, police may choose to engage in inappropriate sense-enhanced searches,
where they would be forbidden to undertake a physical search. It is difficult for citizens to
challenge such practices in criminal or civil court when they have no knowledge of when a search
occurred, or what information was gathered. Id. at 571-74.
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people's "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property. ' 185 Thus, Boyd defined a Fourth Amendment
search in terms of the "substance," "essence," and "substantial purpose" of the government's action. 186
Besides looking to Boyd and Katz, the modern Court may find
in the common, contemporary applications of the term
guidance 187
"search."'
While science has advanced society's technological capabilities, our language has developed concurrently. In computerized
applications, a "search" is an examination of a series of items for any
definition is akin to the
that have a desired characteristic. 18This
of the Fourth
the
adoption
traditional searches that motivated
Amendment. It is also particularly applicable since advanced surveillance techniques are generally computer-based.
The Court may find it instructive that, within the computer industry, computer-based searches are not defined according to what information the computer is capable of accessing. A computer may havelike government agents have had throughout the ages-the raw capability needed to gain access to virtually unlimited confidential information. However, computerized searches, in practice, are restrained
185. See supra text accompanying note 52.
186. See supra text accompanying note 52-53.
187. See supra note 17. Clark Cunningham has written an excellent linguistic analysis of the
term "search." See Cunningham, supra note 17. He proposes a common sense approach to
linguistic analyses of legal texts, and analyzes the meaning of "search" within this analytic framework. His approach begins with a semantic analysis of the senses that words have in everyday
speech, before addressing the issues of competing authoritative interpretations. He argues "[i]f
we cannot understand what an interpretation means, we can hardly debate its correctness." hL
at 542. "[Mjore fundamentally," he reminds us, "law that cannot be understood well enough to
apply prospectively to order social action ceases to be law at all and becomes merely the ad hoc
dictates of persons who occupy positions of authority at a particular point in time." IdL
After the Court decided Smith in 1979 it appeared that the preliminary inquiry in
most fourth amendment cases-whether the challenged action is a search-no longer
depended on the meaning of any word, but on a rule of legitimacy that subsumed the
entire analysis. Prosecutors, defendants, the lower judiciary, and, most important, the
police were in a quandary. The post-Katz cases had failed to provide either semantic or
policy guidance in applying this newly unfamiliar word: "search." Something was a
search only if it infringed a legitimate privacy interest, and it seemed the only way to
find out if an interest was legitimate was to obtain a ruling from the Supreme Court.
Id. at 582-83; see also Robert C. Power, Criminal Law: Technology and the Fourth Amendment
A Proposed Formulation for Visual Searches, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1989).
"'[S]earches' should take its meaning from common sense and apply to those actions that in
reality rummage through or about persons, houses, papers, or effects. The government therefore
engages in a search whenever it examines a target's person or other protected place or thing."
Id. at 60.
188. See, e.g., CHARLES J. SIPPL, DICTIONARY OF DATA COMMUNICATIONS (2d ed. 1985).
"[S]earch: To examine a series of items for any that have a desired property or properties." Id.
at 439.
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by security rules and procedures that limit actual access to only authorized searches. 189
The modem computerized organization employs a security administrator who parallels the role of the court by insuring that any
computer users are pre-authorized according to well established procedures. 19° Before any information may be accessed a legitimate purpose must be demonstrated and authorization granted. Any attempt
to access any information not specifically authorized constitutes a security violation.
Like the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, this authorization restricts the circumstances under which a search is allowed and
the specific information that may be accessed. 191 If the Court held
that computer-based searches performed by the government were
Fourth Amendment "searches," the warrant requirement would implement controls that parallel standard security practices used
throughout computerized industries.
E. The ConstitutionalIssues
The Court must reorient its Fourth Amendment threshold analysis to the larger Constitutional principles and issues. In a free society,
privacy expectations among individuals are not the same as privacy
expectations between individuals and their government. 192 Constitu189. See, e.g., Carl B. Jackson, The Need for Security, in 1 DATAPRO REPORTS ON INFORMATION SECURITY IS09-100-101 (Datapro Info. Serv. Group ed. Feb. 1994) (describing the historical development of computer security control practices, and the components of modern
information security programs); see also Harry B. DeMaio, INFORMATION PROTECTION AND
OTHER UNNATURAL Acrs (AMACOM 1992), reprinted in Elements of Access Control, in 3
DATAPRO REPORTS ON INFORMATION SECURITY IS50-100-101 (Datapro Info. Serv. Group ed.
Feb. 1994).
190. See DeMaio, supra note 189. "The primary purpose of an information security program
is to allow authorized persons and processes to do what they are supposed to do and to prevent
everything else." Id.
at 101.
191. See id.
All access control mechanisms must do the same basic things. They must
determine:
1. Who is authorized to access the system, information, or resources in question.
2. What they are authorized to do.
3. How they are authorized to do it.
4. What specific parts or aspects of the resource they can access.
5. Under what circumstances they can access them.
Then the access control mechanism must control the person's or processes' activities
accordingly.
Id. at 101-02.
192. "Fortunately, neither Katz nor the fourth amendment asks what we expect of government. They tell us what we should demand of government." Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 384.
Consideration of "voluntary assumptions of risk is wildly besides the point. The fact that our
ordinary social intercourse, uncontrolled by government, imposes certain risks upon us hardly
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tional protections prohibit certain government activity in the private
sector. In contrast, the same activity, including unreasonable
searches, when performed by private citizens, may be either tolerated
193
or restrained according to social customs and tort and criminal laws.
Privacy intrusions among individuals cannot constitutionally justify
unjustifiable intrusions by the government.
The Court's analysis should focus on the actions of government
agents, not the actions of private citizens. 194 The Fourth Amendment
guarantees security from government searches that are unreasonable.
New Fourth Amendment challenges continue to come before the
courts because "[tihe progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage... [did not] stop with wire-tapping."' 195
Each case requires an analysis of the reasonableness of a government
agent's actions, not of the reasonableness of an individual's claim to a
"right to be let alone."'1 96 By focusing on the latter, the modern Court
bypasses the former, central constitutional question.
The resulting loss of Fourth Amendment protection affects all
members of American society-criminal suspects and non-suspects
alike. 197 Each time the Court holds that the Fourth Amendment does
means that government is constitutionally unconstrained in adding to those risks." Id. at 406.
Amsterdam wrote:
[T]he authors of the Bill of Rights had known oppressive government... I believe they
meant to erect every safeguard against it... [and] guarantee to their survivors the right
to live as free from every interference of government agents as our condition would
permit ....
[l]t seems to me that the guarantee against unreasonable "searches and
seizures" was written.., to assure that any and every form of such interference is at
least regulated by fundamental law so that it may be "restrained within proper
bounds."
I at 400.
193. Ken Gormley distinguishes tort and Fourth Amendment privacy law. Gormley, supra
note 44, at 1357-74. The function of tort law is to preserve individuality by controlling the flow
of information about oneself. I. at 1374. In comparison:
[T]he Fourth Amendment species of privacy is designed to preserve "secrecy" or "sanctuary" or "solitude" vis-a-vis the government, allowing one to carry on one's activities
in life-working, praying, interacting with family, owning property, reading, relaxing,
thinking-without unjustified interference from the body politic. Such solitude was
viewed as a core aspect of individual liberty at the time American democracy took
shape. ...
Id.
194. See Power, supra note 187. Power states that although Katz accurately identified the
protection of privacy as the underlying policy of the Fourth Amendment, Katz erroneously assumed that it had to look at individual expectations of privacy in each case. "This resulted in
judicial emphasis on the target and the disavowal of interest in the method of intrusion. But the
fourth amendment makes a different choice-it prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures ....
[T]he amendment itself regulates certain law enforcement techniques. Judicial
emphasis should therefore be on police methods." Id. at 59.
195. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 478; see also supra text accompanying note 61.
197. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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not apply because a defendant's expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable, the American people concurrently and collectively
lose an enforceable expectation of privacy from government
intrusion. 198
Meanwhile, modern life, and even the natural emissions of electromagnetic energy, increasingly forces exposure of the private lives
of individuals. Unrestrained surveillance exploits this compelled exposure and places a heavy burden upon our society' 99 that is incongruous with our political system.2°° In this age, more than ever, 201 it is
essential that the Court heed Justice Bradley's statement regarding
the judiciary's obligation to safeguard the American people: "It is the
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citi'20 2
zen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
IV.

THE

THERMAL IMAGING CASES

Since 1991, several courts have considered whether the government conducted a Fourth Amendment "search" when agents used
thermal infrared systems to read and analyze the characteristics of
2
home infrared emissions. This section reviews five of these cases. 03
198. "[Tjhe principles which immunize government surveillance of a criminal's behavior
from the fourth amendment's command also immunize that surveillance when it is directed at
the citizen who has never committed a crime in his life." Katz, supra note 160, at 550; see also R.
H. M., Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment
Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297 (1985). The author argues that the Fourth Amendment analysis
should assess the aggregate losses and negative effects that the people collectively suffer where
unrestrained police surveillance, rather than privacy, becomes the expected norm. Id.
199. The Fourth Amendment cannot be interpreted to require Americans to withdraw into
the recesses of their lives, as this would be contrary to our traditional commitment to an open
society. Amsterdam, supranote 2, at 402. In 1974, Amsterdam wrote that, according his knowledge of the state of technology, "anyone can protect himself against surveillance by retiring to
the cellar, cloaking all the windows with thick caulking, turning off the lights and remaining
absolutely quiet." lit In the 1990s, this may no longer be sufficient.
200. See, e.g., Gutterman supra note 4. "The newly approved technological police techniques
are 'abhorrent to the instincts of an American,' and are better suited to 'the purposes of despotic
power' than to 'the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom."' Id. at 721
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632 (1886)). "The fine line between citizens and
their government is the very boundary that separates our system from more repressive states.
The totalitarian government depends on secrecy for the state, but intensive surveillance of its
citizenry. The democratic society relies on publicity for its actions, and on privacy for its people." Id. at 705.
The U.S. stands
201. "'The U.S. is an embarrassment to the privacy movement overseas ....
alone as an example of what a superpower should not do in privacy."' Piller, supra note 151
(quoting Simon Davies, director of the Australian Privacy Foundation). Regarding the Clinton
Administrations multi-billion-dollar "data superhighway," the protection of personal information is the privacy issue of the twenty-first century, "yet so far the government has ignored the
privacy implications of the project." Id. at *6.
202. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
203. United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, No. 94-40159, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 4957 (5th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995); United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787 (D. Or.
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In each case, the systems were used to determine whether residents
were using indoor grow lights to cultivate marijuana inside the enclosed buildings. Without warrants, the government used thermal
imaging techniques in combination with other "non-search" methods,
such as visual observation, reviewing the records of gardening and
equipment supply retailers, analyzing utility company records of home

powet usage, and combing through household refuse.
A.

Four Federal District Court FLIR Cases

1. Risking Surveillance by Generating Heat
United States v. Penny-Feeney2°4 was the first district court case to
consider the use of FLIRs within the Fourth Amendment context. On
April 3, 1990, Hawaii County police officers conducted a physical

search of the defendants' home, pursuant to a search warrant, and
found an indoor marijuana growing operation. The probable cause
supporting the search warrant was based in part on evidence gathered

earlier that day with a FLIR system.2 05

At 5:15 a.m., two police officers, and a private pilot experienced
in the use of FLIRs, flew over the defendants' home in a helicopter
equipped with a FLIR system. The residence appeared dark to the
naked eye. However, the FLIR's video monitor displayed bright
white tones on the walls and areas of the garage. They also aimed the
FLIR at other residences in the area and found that they appeared in
a different color than the defendants' residence. The pilot concluded

that the thermal infrared image of the defendants' residence was consistent with images of structures that employed artificial lighting to
2 °6
cultivate marijuana indoors.
1992), remanded for evidentiary hr'g, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Deaner, No.
Cr-92-0090-91, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13046 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992), affd on other grounds, 1
F.3d 192 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), affd
on other grounds, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); Washington v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash.
1994).
204. 773 F. Supp. at 220.
205. Other elements supporting the warrant included tips from informants and corroborating
observations by a county officer. In addition, two years earlier, law enforcement officers observed one of the defendants picking up a package containing money. The officers had searched
the package, pursuant to a warrant. A narcotics-trained dog gave a positive alert on the money.
No charges were filed. Id. at 221-23.
206. The pilot had operated the device "15 to 20 times in the past for marijuana searches."
Id. at 223.
Images from previous positive sightings, used as a model for future sightings, is reminiscent
of the term, used in the natural sciences, "search-image." See CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

794 (Peter M. B. Walker ed., 1988). Search-image, when used as a

behavioral term, "[drefers to the perceptual phenomena of an increased accuracy of discrimination for certain objects in the environment, e.g. a predator's improved ability to see camouflaged

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:803

The defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the
government engaged in an illegal warrantless search when it subjected
their home to a FLIR inspection. The court held that the government's warrantless use of the FLIR was not prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment because it did not constitute a search. The court noted
that the FLIR is a passive instrument that does not send beams or rays
into the object of investigation, or penetrate the object in anyway. It
stressed that the FLIR detects only surface temperature variations by
measuring heat emanations from outside the home. It also noted that
the defendants did not take measures to contain the emissions within
their home. The court based its holding on these facts, and found support for its conclusion in several Supreme Court decisions.
The Penny-Feeney court first applied a Katz two-prong analysis to
determine whether the defendants had an actual expectation of privacy, and if so, whether such an expectation was one that society
would consider reasonable. With regard to the first prong of the Katz
test, the court concluded that the defendants did not manifest an actual expectation of privacy because they voluntarily vented their heat
outside their garage. The defendants exposed their heat to the public
and did not attempt to prevent its escape or exercise dominion over
it.207

In its application of the first prong of the Katz test, the court did
not consider whether the defendants had an actual expectation of privacy regarding the activities within their home. Nor did it consider
whether the defendants, by cultivating their crop inside rather than
outside, manifested an expectation of privacy. Instead, the court restricted its analysis to whether the defendants demonstrated an actual
expectation of privacy in their heat emissions.
Although the court concluded there was no subjective expectation of privacy, it continued its analysis with regard to the second
prong of the Katz analysis. It found that even if the defendants had
demonstrated an actual expectation of privacy, other Supreme Court
decisions suggested that such an expectation would be unreasonable
20
to society.

8

prey against its background." Id. Search-image, when used as a behavioral ecology term, is "a
predator's pre-conception of what its prey looks like and where it is found." Id.
207. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 225-26.
208. The court said, "[t]ime and again, the United States Supreme Court has held that police
utilization of extra-sensory, non-intrusive equipment ...to investigate people and objects does
not constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment." Id at 226.
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The court compared the FLIR investigation to the investigation
of individuals' garbage in Greenwood. It characterized the thermal
emissions as the incidental byproduct of various indoor energy
sources.2 °9 It analogized the thermal infrared emissions to the garbage in Greenwood, calling it "heat waste" or "abandoned heat" that
was disposed in an area exposed to the public. 210 The court said that
in Greenwood, the public exposure was visual and the need to open
opaque bags to view the contents did not diminish that fact. Similarly,
the district court reasoned, the public exposure in Penny-Feeney was
heat-sensory, and the need to use a FLIR to detect the emissions did
21 1
not diminish that fact.
The court continued its analysis by comparing the use of the
FLIR to the use of a canine-sniff. 212 The Penny-Feeney court found
the use of the FLIR,like a canine-sniff, involved no embarrassment to
or search of the individuals. The court stated that the target was heatemanations that, like the odor emanations detected by a canine, was a
213
physical fact, not a protected communication.
Finally, the Penny-Feeney court considered the government's use
of a helicopter above the defendants' home. Citing Ciraolo and
Riley, 21 4 it noted that the helicopter was flown in navigable airspace.
It continued, "[o]f utmost importance ...the observation was physically nonintrusive. '' 21 5 Operating the FLIR from the helicopter
"caused absolutely no physical invasion of the home or curtilage. '' 21 6
Instead, the government "did no more than aim a passive infrared instrument at defendants' house from an aerial vantage point for the
'2 17
purpose of detecting disposed heat on the exterior of the house.
The court further noted that the officers did not observe intimate de209. Id.
210. l1 at 225-26.
211. Id. at 226.
212. The court cited United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d. 880 (9th Cir. 1976). In Soils, government drug agents detected the presence of marijuana inside a trailer by using a trained dog,

whose sense of smell was eight times as acute as that of humans. The Soils court held that the
use of a dog to supplement the agent's senses did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. It

noted that the officer's methods were inoffensive, did not cause embarrassment to a person in
the trailer, and did not involve a search of the person. Id. at 883. It further noted that, unlike

Katz, the "target was a physical fact indicative of possible crime, not protected communications." Id. at 882.
213. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 227.
214. See supra text accompanying note 110.
215. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 228.
216. Id.

217. Id.
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tails connected with the house or curtilage, and did not cause undue
noise, wind, dust, or threat of injury.218
Although the Penny-Feeney court applied the Katz test by analogizing the facts to more recent Court decisions, its analysis was reminiscent of Olmstead,219 and contradicted the reasoning of the Katz
decision. The court considered the FLIR non-intrusive. It stressed
that the FLIR is a passive instrument 220 that does not penetrate the
object of its investigation. However, the Katz majority opinion stipulated that "[t]he fact that [an] electronic device ...[does] not happen
to penetrate the wall... can have no constitutional significance." 221
Like Olmstead, the district court's pre-Katz focus is "bad physics and
bad law," since electronic invasions can defeat reasonable expectations of privacy.m
Moreover, the court contradicted Katz by holding that the defendants had failed to manifest an expectation of privacy by failing to
exercise dominion over the escaping heat. In Katz, the Court did not
ask whether the caller took extraordinary precautions 223 to prevent
sound waves from emanating beyond the telephone booth. It was
enough that the caller shut the door.224 Similarly, containing activities

within the walls and doors of a house should suffice to show a subjective expectation of privacy.
The district court found it significant that the FLIR inspected a
physical fact, in contrast to Katz, which regarded a protected communication. This distinction is not supported by Katz, and it is doubtful,
218. Id. For a comprehensive analysis of Penny-Feeney, see Steele, supra note 39. The author states that the FLIR can discern what lays behind the solid walls of a dwelling by the
amount of heat radiated through those walls. Id. at 34. In Penney-Feeney, the "state's expert
described [the FLIR] as a 'crude instrument in [that] what you obtain from it. . . is an image or a
heat distribution pattern of objects in a scene that you're viewing. No way you can identify
persons as you would with a video camera, but it ... can tell you whether there is a person
there."' Id. at 34 n.73.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
220. In remote sensing systems, sensors are either passive or active. Passive devices read
natural EMR emissions and reflections, while active devices project energy and read the reflections. See generally AVERY & BERLIN, supra note 23, at 15.
221. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
222. See id at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). Compare United States v. Domitrovich, where
the district court stated, "[Tihe fact that information gleaned from surveillance of external phenomena allows law enforcement officials to draw accurate inferences regarding activities occurring inside a structure does not convert the surveillance into a search." United States v.
Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp 1460, 1475 (1994).
223. As Wayne LaFave points out, an assertion that extraordinary precautions are necessary
cannot be squared with Katz. Katz did not require the defendant to take any precautionary
measures against electronic surveillance. Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment Today: A
BicentennialAppraisal, 32 VILL L. REV. 1061, 1080-81 (1987).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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in light of Karo, that even the modern Supreme Court would find the
distinction significant. Nothing in Katz indicates that protected privacy interests are limited to communications. In Karo, the Court rejected the government's argument that there was no Fourth
Amendment search when the government used an electric device,
while it was located inside a home, to determine only whether an object was located within the home. The Karo Court reasoned that the
electronic device revealed a "critical fact about the interior of the
premises that the Government [was] extremely interested in
knowing." 225
Also, although the Penny-Feeney court found it significant that
the FLIR did not intercept "protected communications," it is not evident, despite the court's words, that an individual would be protected
from remote sensing devices capable of intercepting communications.
Some courts have held that the government may listen to personal
communications made with cordless phones because such communications are easily intercepted, beyond the curtilage, by private third
22 6
parties.
Nor is it evident that the court would have held differently if it
found that the thermal images revealed intimate details connected
with the house. The court characterize home infrared radiation as
household "waste," comparable to the household garbage in Greenwood. In Greenwood, the dissent pointed out that household garbage
inevitably reveals the most intimate details about the lives of household residents. 227 However, the Greenwood majority did not consider
the exposure of such intimate details as a factor in its analysis.
Similar to Greenwood, the individual in Penny-Feeney was compelled to expose household information, contained in "heat waste,"
outside the home. In Greenwood, local governmental ordinances
compelled the individual to dispose the garbage outside of the
house. 228 In Penny-Feeney, it was mother nature that compelled the
emission of electromagnetic infrared radiation. Thus, in United States

225. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984); see also Washington v. Young, 867 P.2d
593, 602 (1994) ("[Llike Karo, the information conveyed by the infrared device was critical to
the government. The police relied heavily on the infrared surveillance results, and the inferences
that could be drawn from them, in obtaining a search warrant.")
226. See supra notes text 143-44 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 109.
228. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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v. Deaner,22 9 efforts to contain heat within the home did not inhibit
the government's effective utilization of the FLIR technology.
In Deaner,residents of Mifflin County, Pennsylvania had boarded
up some of their home's windows, and covered one window with nontransparent plastic. An agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), who was conducting a surveillance of the individuals,
viewed the window coverings as indicative of an indoor marijuana cultivation operation. 230 With a FLIR-equipped fixed-wing aircraft,
DEA agents twice conducted thermal imaging reconnaissance of the
properties located in the area.23 1 The thermal image of the Deaner
home was distinct from the images of other homes in the area. It was
also consistent with the image captured in another "positive
232
sighting.,
The Deaner court observed that the individuals made an effort to
contain their heat. Thus, in contrast to Penny-Feeney, it found no evidence that these individuals had "abandoned their interest in the
heat. '2 33 However, the court determined that the effort to contain the
heat was, in itself, evidence that the individuals had no expectation of
privacy in their heat. The effort demonstrated the individuals' expec234
tations that heat would escape from the house.
Thus, the Deaner court flatly held that "there is no expectation of
privacy as to heat emanating from one's home" 235 and found it "abundantly clear that the use of the FLIR was well within the bounds of
the Fourth Amendment. ' 236 Like Penny-Feeney it compared the
229. United States v. Deaner, No. CR-92-0090-01, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13046 (M.D. Pa.
July 27, 1992), affd on other grounds, 1 F.3d 192 (3rd Cir. 1993).
230. The agent also determined that the individual had purchased 244 pounds of supplies
from an indoor-outdoor garden supply company. The agent also identified receipts from the
supply company, and remnants of marijuana plants mixed with soil, while searching through the
household refuse. Id. at *2-4.
231. Id. at *4, 7.
232. Id. at *4.
233. Id. at *8.
234. "[T]here was an expectation that heat would escape from the house, as evidenced by the
defendants' efforts to keep the heat inside." Id. at *11.
235. Id. at *9.
236. Id. at *11. The convictions in both Deaner and Penny-Feeney were affirmed, on other
grounds, by the Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit, respectively. United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d
192 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993). The appellate courts
found it unnecessary to consider whether an FLIR investigation of a home implicates the Fourth
Amendment. Deaner, 1 F.3d at 197; Feeney, 984 F.2d at 1054-55. In both cases, the government
had gathered sufficient evidence, through other surveillance methods, to support warrants to
search the homes. Thus, even if the FLIR evidence was excluded, the warrants would have been
valid and the outcome of each case would have been unchanged. United States v. Karo, 486 U.S.
705, 721 (1984) (holding that unlawfully obtained evidence will not invalidate a warrant where
officers have lawfully gathered additional evidence sufficient to establish probable cause.)
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FLIR inspection to a canine sniff.2 37 It added that DEA aerial-FLIR
surveillance is less intrusive than a canine-sniff. It is less embarrassing
and offensive because, in contrast, dogs must be accompanied by government agents and must work in close proximity to the target.2 38
Also, the FLIR only provides definitive information about heat generation, unlike a canine-sniff which gives a "decisive indication" that
'239
contraband is "behind closed doors.
The Deaner court said, "The fact that the FLIR is a sophisticated
electronic device is irrelevant." 24 It characterized the FLIR as a device that is in general use for commercial purposes, such as the detection of leaks and cracks in buildings, pipes, and high voltage
transmission lines. 24 1 The court observed that many companies mar-

ket the device, and that it is readily available for purchase or rental, or
through the services of a thermographer. 242
The Deaner court recognized that the DEA "utilized the FLIR to
confirm . .. [a] belief that Deaner was operating a marijuana grow
The appeals of Penny-Feeney and Deaner did not settle the FLIR issue. Nonetheless, the
homes in those circuits may be, by default, subject to unlimited FLIR surveillance. In future
criminal proceedings, there will be no judicial review of FLIR inspections, except where the
government fails to gather additional evidence, sufficient to establish probable cause, before
seeking a search warrant.
Also, there may be no judicial review if an individual wishes to file a civil suit challenging
the constitutionality of an FLIR inspection. A government officer will be held liable for conducting an unlawful search only where pre-existing law made the unlawfulness of the search
apparent. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
The principles of qualified immunity that we reaffirm today require that ... [the FBI
officer] be permitted to argue that he is entitled to summary judgment on the ground
that, in light of the clearly established principles governing warrantless searches, he
could, as a matter of law, reasonably have believed that the search of the ...[individual's] home was lawful.
Id. at 641. After these circuit court decisions, the unlawfulness of an FLIR inspection is less than
apparent. Thus, unless and until the appellate courts hold otherwise, the government may conduct infrared inspections of homes without any justification and without fear of liability.
237. Deaner, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13046, at *8-11.
238. Id. at *11.
239. Id. This analysis is incongruous with the Supreme Court's dicta that regarded canine
sniffs as relatively non-intrusive precisely because they definitively revealed only the presence of
concealed contraband, and did not expose the presence of noncontraband items.
[A canine sniff] does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain
hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer's rummaging through the
contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through
this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the
sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the
luggage, the information obtained is limited.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
240. Deaner, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13046, at *8.
241. Id. at *6.
242. Id.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:803

room in his house. '243 Yet, the court characterized the FLIR as a device whose "sole function" is to measure surface temperature distinctions, and it concluded that "this information alone tells the DEA
nothing of the activity going on inside the structure."'244 The court
noted that the evidence submitted at the suppression hearing did not
support the defendants' view that the FLIR enables the DEA "essentially to look through walls and roofs to obtain evidence of what is
'2 45
going on inside.
The defendant in the third FLIR case, United States v. Kyllo, 246
offered to prove the FLIR's capability to intrude upon the privacies of
the home. In Kyllo, a special agent of the Bureau of Land Management had enlisted the aid of the Oregon National Guard to create
thermal images of an individual's home.2 47 The government argued
that the FLIR "did not reveal intimate details as to the inside of the
home. '248 Instead, it analogized the use of a FLIR, to detect heat
emanations and to infer the presence of grow lights, to a visual obser243. Id. at *7.
244. Id. But see United States v. Olson, 21 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
230 (1994) (the court considered, but did not decide, a motion to suppress evidence from a FLIR
inspection); Washington v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (1994).
Still photographs of the mobile home were made from the [FLIR] videotape. The
photographs revealed rafters on the north side of the mobile home that were visible
due to the extreme heat. The agent who reviewed the videotape noted as well that the
mobile home appeared to be split into two rooms; the divider wall was visible due to
the transfer of heat from the north end of the home into the wall.
Olson, 21 F.3d at 848 n.5.
With this [thermal detection] device the officer was able to, in effect, "see through the
walls" of the home. The device goes well beyond an enhancement of natural senses. In
addition, the nighttime infrared surveillance enabled the officers to conduct their surveillance without Mr. Young's knowledge. The infrared device thus represents a particularly intrusive means of observation that exceeds our established surveillance limits.
...When directed at a home, the infrared device allows the officer to determine
which particular rooms a homeowner is heating, and thus using, at night. This information may reflect a homeowner's financial inability to heat the entire home, the existence and location of energy consuming and heat producing appliances, and possibly
even the number of people who may be staying at the residence on a given night. The
device discloses information about activities occurring within the confines of the home,
and which a person is entitled to keep from disclosure absent a warrant.
Young, 867 P.2d at 598.
245. Deaner, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13046, at *8 n.1.
246. 809 F. Supp. 787 (D. Or. 1992), remanded for evidentiary hr'g, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir.
1994).
247. The officers were investigating an indoor marijuana growing operation. The investigation of Kyllo followed from an investigation of another individual, Sam Shook, which was conducted by a task force consisting of several government agencies: The United States
Department of Interior, the Bureau of Land Management, the Tillamook County Sheriff's Department, and the Oregon State Police Bureau. Id. at 789.
248. Id. at 792.
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vation of smoke coming from a chimney to infer there was a fire in the
fireplace. 249
The defense sought to show that the FLIR is a sophisticated and
sensitive instrument that can determine the types and locations of
heat sources within a building, and the presence or absence of insulation. 250 With prolonged use, a trained FLIR operator can detect "sexual activity, the comings and goings of people, or movement from
room to room" 251 within the target home. However, the district court
limited the scope of the suppression hearing, and would not allow the
defendant's expert witness to testify about thermal imaging technology. 252 Without hearing this evidence, the court concluded that "no
intimate details of the home 253 were observed; and there was no intrusion upon the privacy of the individuals within the home." 254 Agreeing with Penny-Feeney, the Kyllo district court held that using a FLIR
to detect "surface waste heat" 255 does not constitute a Fourth Amend256
ment search.
The court stated that the Supreme Court has long held that,
where there is no warrant, invasion of constitutionally protected
homes is presumptively unreasonable. 257 The district court also
stated, "The use of sophisticated modem mechanical or electronic devices and the frightening implications of their possible development
have led to abandonment of the test of physical trespass within the
protected area and a broadening of protection to cover a 'reasonable
expectation of privacy.' 258 However, the court did not clarify what
type of "modem mechanical or electronic devices," if not the FLIR,

249. Id.
250. Appellant's Opening Brief at 40, United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994) (No.

93-30231).
251. Appellant's Reply Brief at 14, United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994) (No.

93-30231)..
252. Appellant's Opening Brief at 39-40, Kyllo (No. 93-30231). The witness was an expert in
energy conservation and consumption. Id. at 21. The court limited the suppression hearing to a
single issue and allowed the expert to testify only with regard to that issue. See id. The single
issue was whether the government agent had distorted and manipulated power consumption
charts from the Portland General Electric Company for the purpose of drawing a false picture to

support the search warrant. Id. at 6.
253. The Kyllo court did not explain what might constitute intimate details of the home.
254. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. at 792.
255. Id.
256. Id.

257. Id. at 791-92.
258. IL at 792 (quoting United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 1976).
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might provide "sufficiently frightening implications of their possible
259
development" to qualify for Fourth Amendment restrictions.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not decide whether the FLIR
inspection in Kyllo constituted a Fourth Amendment search. 260 However, it held that the district court had erred by deciding the issue
without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 2 61 The circuit court remanded Kyllo to the district court for findings on the technological
capabilities of the device. 26 2 It said, "[O]ur analysis will be affected by
whether, on the one extreme, this device can detect sexual activity in
the bedroom ... or, at the other extreme, whether it can only detect
'263
hot spots where heat is escaping from a structure.
2.

Another Opinion: A Protected Expectation of Privacy

Contrary to the district court holdings in Penny-Feeney, Deaner,
and Kyllo, the district court in United States v. Ishmael264 held that the
use of thermal imaging technology to investigate a private building
265
constituted a Fourth Amendment search and required a warrant.
This holding did not survive its appeal in the Fifth Circuit. Nonetheless, the district court's opinion in Ishmael merits attention because it
articulates an alternative approach for applying the Katz test to FLIR
surveillance cases.
259. The defendant in Kyllo cited an unpublished state court opinion which considered the
implications of developing thermal imaging technology. Appellant's Opening Brief at 45, Kyllo,
(No. 93-30231) (referring to State v. Binner, No. 92-04-1789 and 1790 (Or. Cir. Ct., Harey Cty.
1993), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 877 P.2d 642 (Or. App. 1994)). The state court held
that the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device violated the Oregon and United States
Constitutions.
It is obvious.., that the use of the thermal imaging equipment was aimed at ascertaining what activities may be occurring within the interior of the house involved....
Although one may be impressed with the technological advances involved in the thermal imaging equipment, within a few years the device may appear to be like a stagecoach compared to today's cross-country commercial jets. . . . [Hiow far will
Constitutional protections tolerate allowing technological enhanced observations of
that which is escaping from a protected place, like one's home, in order to determine
what is occurring inside the protected place?
Appellant's Opening Brief at 46, Kyllo (No. 93-30231) (quoting Binner, No. 92-1789 & 1790).
The Kyllo district court did not address the question posed by Binner.
260. United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 531 (9th Cir. 1994).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id- at 530-31. The circuit court stated that the inquiry regarding reasonable expectations of privacy "cannot be conducted in the abstract." Id. at 530. Rather, it requires "some
gauge of the intrusiveness of the thermal imaging device, which depends on the quality and the
degree of detail of information that it can glean." Id. (citing Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. 227, 238).
264. 843 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (order granting defendants' motion to suppress),
rev'd, No. 94-40159, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4957 (5th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995).
265. Id. at 213.
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The Ishmael district court concluded that the government had violated the owners' Fourth Amendment rights because it used the technology without first obtaining a warrant. The court said:
The issue was spawned by the tension created between the right to
privacy on the one hand and our society's rapidly evolving technological sophistication on the other .. . We must take care that the
war on drugs not count as one of its victims fundamental rights. The
benefits to our society of safeguarding the right to privacy is such
that the courts must say that there is a limit
to the use of technologi266
cal weapons, even in the war on drugs.
In Ishmael, the DEA had begun a year-long surveillance of an
individual upon receiving information that the individual was mixing
concrete remix for a construction project on his secluded wooded
property.267 Law enforcement officers entered the property to conduct surveillance but found no illegal activity.2 68 One year later, the
DEA resumed the surveillance and determined that the individual
had constructed a metal building on his property and used the con269
crete to build a basement under the building.
Officers used a FLIR-equipped helicopter to tape thermal images
of the metal building from approximately 1000-1500 feet, and they entered the property to use a handheld thermal imager. The images revealed that the building and a nearby brush pile were considerably
hotter than the surrounding land. The officers also conducted a series
of visual aerial and ground-based observations, and analyzed records
of the individual's criminal history, phone calls, purchases, and electrical usage. 2 70 A search warrant was then obtained, and a physical
search of the building revealed a marijuana-growing operation.
266. Id. at 207-08.
267. Id. at 208. The informant had delivered large quantities of the remix to the individual
who paid in cash. The informant observed that the individual appeared nervous or suspicious,
and did not want to be accompanied to the construction site. Id.
268. d The officers found two mobile homes, large plastic tanks, and a trailer containing

pipe. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. The individual's criminal history included possession, distribution, and growing of
marijuana.
In 1991, the individual purchased the 130 acre tract of land. During 1991-1993, the individual made extensive purchases of construction equipment and supplies, electrical supplies, and
farm and garden supplies. Electrical records showed an increased usage of electricity during
1993 in both the mobile home and the metal building. Visual observations showed that the metal
building had a exhaust fan that was continuously running, and that pressurized water flowed
from the building to a nearby pond. Id.
The individual had an equipment rental business which did not have a local telephone listing. During seven different day and nighttime trespasses upon the property, officers did not
observe any signs of vehicle traffic or people around the building. The officers concluded the
building was not the site of a legitimate business operation. Id. at 209.
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The Ishmael district court applied the Katz two-prong test. Regarding the first prong, it concluded that the individual had demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy when he located the
building in a secluded area and personally constructed the basement
so that others would not know about its existence. 271
Regarding the second prong, the court noted that the "test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal his activity,
but instead 'whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.' ' 272
The court found that the individual's expectation of privacy was reasonable because the property was a business premises that was not
open to the public, 273 and the thermal images allowed the officers to
274
observe what was not visible to the naked eye.
The court noted that the Fourth Amendment does not protect
individuals against surveillance of property that is plainly visible from
the air or ground. 275 However, the court rejected the government's
argument that the heat emissions were in plain view. It also did not
agree that the warrantless use of thermal imaging devices was consistent with the holding in Dow Chemical.
Instead, the court pointed to Dow Chemical's warning that the
surveillance of private property using highly sophisticated technology
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.276 The thermal
imaging technology detected and recorded an image of something that
was not plainly viewable. 277 Thus, the court found that thermal imagBased on this information and the thermal images, a DEA agent swore out an affidavit for a
warrant to physically search the property. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-83 (1984)).
273. Id. at 212. The court found that the building should be characterized as a business
premise; therefore it was subject to the same Fourth Amendment protection as a house. Evidence showed that the business was duly registered with the State of Texas, and that the premises was not open to the public. The court rejected the government's assertions that the building
was not used for a legitimate business, and that the "open fields" doctrine should apply because
the building was located outside the curtilage of defendants' home. Id. at 209-11. The court
noted that there is "no authority for, and no logic in,creating an exception to the warrant re-

quirement because law enforcement officials believe that a particular business is engaged in
illegal activity." Id. at 211.
274. id. at 212.
275. In support, the court reviewed the facts and holdings in Ciraolo and Riley. Id. at 211.
The court also noted that although the officers trespassed upon the property, this has "little or

no relevance to the application of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 210 (citing Oliver,466 U.S. at
184).
276. Id.at 212. See supra text accompanying note 134.
277. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 212; see also, Field, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8829.
Whether a device is passive is irrelevant; what is relevant is what the device records....
[T]he imager records the heat escaping from the walls that is emitted by an object on
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ing devices were "exactly the type of sophisticated technology that
concerned the Supreme Court" 278 in Dow Chemical.
The Ishmael district court also disagreed with Penny-Feeney's
analogy comparing heat emissions to abandoned garbage. 279 It stated
that the waste heat analogy might have validity only if the law enforcement agent had detected the heat without a sense-enhancing device. 80 The court said, "If the government has the right to repeatedly
trespass, conduct visual searches..., and make frequent flyovers usa warrant, there
ing FLIR and other advanced technology, all'2 without
81
is precious little left of the right to privacy.
Finally, the Ishmael district court disagreed that a FLIR inspection is comparable to a canine sniff. The FLIR is more intrusive because the thermal imager cannot distinguish between "contraband
Also, although a dog's sense of smell may
heat" and "legal heat."
supplement a human's senses, it "does not compare to a technology
that can turn minute gradations in temperature into video tapes from
'283
1500 feet away.
The court found that absent the FLIR images there was insufficient evidence of illegal activity to support the warrant to search the
building. 2s4 "The evidence of their activity was consistent with developing a new patented strain of African Violets, and innumerable other
perfectly legal activities. ' 28 5 Thus, the court granted the defendants'
2s
motion to suppress all evidence seized during the physical search. 6
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the defendant in Ishmael
had satisfied the first-prong of the Katz test. The defendants had
clearly exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, "[tlhough the
Ishmaels did not-indeed, could not-take every precaution against
the detection of the hydroponic laboratory. ' 28 7 However, the appelthe other side of the wall. To the extent the device can pick up such radiation and
record it, it can "see through" walls.

Id. at *2.
278. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 212.
279. Id. at 213.

280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.; accord Field, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8829, at *34.

283. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 213. This reasoning is reminiscent of Justice Douglas' dissent in
White where he argued that to equate electronic surveillance with unaided eavesdropping is like

equating the first gun powder with the nuclear bomb. See supra note 86.
284. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at 214.
285. Id.

286. Id.
287. United States v. Ishmael, No. 94-40159, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4957, at *15 (5th Cir.
Mar. 15, 1995).
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late court concluded that the defendants' privacy expectations were
objectively unreasonable. Like the Penny-Feeney line of cases, the
Fifth Circuit found it significant that the FLIR was a passive device
which was commercially available and did not reveal "intimate details" about the interior of the structure. 288 The appellate court also
found that the defendants' building stood in an "open field. ' 289 The
court concluded that "[t]he device, when used in an 'open field,' does
'290
not offend the Fourth Amendment.
3. Protecting People, Not Heat
The opinions in the federal cases are striking in their diverse approaches to Katz's test for reasonable expectations of privacy. Unlike
the others, the district court's opinion in Ishmael bears a marked resemblance to the original Katz analysis. The Ishmael district court
centered its analysis on the privacy expectations associated with an
individual's personal and business activities. This court concluded
that the individual had reasonable privacy expectations because the
individual took reasonable precautions to conceal the activities from
public observation. It further concluded that using the advanced thermal imaging technology to defeat those expectations was prohibitively
intrusive without a warrant.
In contrast, the Penny-Feeney, Deaner, and Kyllo courts did not
consider whether the individuals had manifested reasonable expectations of privacy regarding their activities, even though they confined
these activities behind the walls and closed doors of their homes. Instead, these courts concentrated their analyses on whether people
have reasonable privacy expectations regarding escaping thermal infrared radiation.
With regard to the subjective prong of the Katz test, Penny-Feeney and Deaner reached the same result based on diametrically opposed reasons. In Penny-Feeney, the government successfully argued
that the individuals failed to exhibit expectations of privacy by failing
to take precautionary steps to conceal their heat. However, the Deaner court found that individuals who had taken such precautionary
steps thereby proved they had no expectations that their heat emissions were private.
288. Id. at *20-21.
289. Id. at *22-23.

290. Id at *25.
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Thus, Deaner creates a complete catch-22 for anyone who would
seek to keep private information that can be detected by a FLIR. After citing Penny-Feeney for the proposition that failing to take precautions defeats Katz's subjective expectation test, the Deaner court
concluded that taking such precautionary efforts also defeats the same
test. 291 By focusing their analyses on the emissions, rather than the
privacy of the people whose activities generated the emissions, these
292
three court opinions bear no resemblance to Katz.
It is disturbing that Penny-Feeney and its progeny considered the
FLIR non-intrusive because it operated passively from a distance.
This illustrates the kind of reasoning that Katz criticized as "bad physics and bad law." The term "passive" may be easily misunderstood as
meaning weak or ineffectual. Instead, being passive, rather than active, means only that the technology operates by sensing emissions
rather than inducing reflections. The Kyllo district court's conclusion
was particularly disturbing since it refused to entertain the evidence
which was offered to prove the intrusive capabilities of this passive
instrument. It is encouraging that the Ninth Circuit remanded Kyllo
so that the evidence could be heard.
The courts should have found that passive surveillance may be
more intrusive than a traditional physical search. The subject of undetectable monitoring never knows if, or what, information is being retrieved and recorded. 293 Thus, one officer recently commented, "The
beauty of thermal imaging is its passivity. We receive information, but
give no indication to the suspect that we are on to him. ' 294 If the
analyses of these courts were extended to their logical conclusion, the
courts could find that some of the most sophisticated satellite remote
sensing systems provide the least intrusive means of citizen
surveillance.
It is inescapable that the sole purpose behind these FLIR inspections was to defeat expectations of privacy in concealed, indoor activi291. Thus, by manifesting a subjective intention to protect privacy, the individuals proved
they had no subjective expectation of privacy at all. Ironically, through their own efforts to
protect their privacy interests, the individuals defeated these interests in two ways. First, their

precautions alerted the government to their desire to protect their home activities from observation; and it provided evidence to infer possible criminal activity. See supra text accompanying
note 225. Second, their precautions convinced the trial court to conclude that they had no expectation of privacy in the emissions they tried to contain.

292. See supra note 218.
293. See supra notes 181, 183-84 and accompanying text.
294. Gareth Huw Davies, Thermal Imager Aids Police in Hot Pursuit, SUNDAY TIMES, Sept.

12, 1993, (Business), at 9 (quoting an English officer who is a member of a police air-support
unit).
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ties. 295 Such purposeful intrusions should not be masked behind

analyses that compare and contrast the privacy expectations in waste,
sound waves, odors, and electromagnetic radiation. Such analyses
recognize only that we are biological creatures inevitably governed by
the laws of physics. They ignore the more relevant truth that we are
also autonomous individuals living in a nation governed by constitutional laws.
B. Protecting People in the State of Washington
In Washington v. Young, 296 the Washington Supreme Court rendered a remarkable opinion which analyzed the government's use of
thermal infrared detection technology to investigate homes. The
court found that the technology "represents a particularly intrusive
means of surveillance," which, in the absence of a warrant, violated its
state constitutional protection of the people's private affairs and
homes, 297 and violated the Fourth Amendment. 298 Late at night, positioned on the street, government officers had used a thermal infrared
detection device "to, in effect, 'see through the walls' of the home" 299
without the resident's knowledge. The court found it "especially
troubling" 3°° and "constitutionally offensive" 30 1 that, as part of the investigation, the officers analyzed and compared the thermal infrared
patterns emitted by other homes in the neighborhood which were not
suspected of housing criminal activity.
If we were to hold the use of the device does not constitute a search,
no limitation would be placed on the government's ability to use the
device on any private residence, on any particular night, even if no
criminal activity is suspected. Such police activity is constitutionally
offensive.
Such unrestricted, sense-enhanced observations present a dangerous amount of police discretion. This kind of surveillance avoids
the protection of a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral
magistrate. Not only does this practice eviscerate the traditional requirement that police identify a particular suspect prior to initiating
a search, but it also facilitates clandestine investigations by the police force, which are not subject to the traditional restraint of public
accountability. Such secret surveillance may not only chill free ex295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

See Washington v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603 (Wash. 1994).
Id. at 593.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id. at 598; see supra note 239.
Young, 867 P.2d at 600.
Id.
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pression, but also may encourage arbitrary and inappropriate police
conduct.? 2
Although the state court based its decision upon the state's con-"
stitution, it also compared and contrasted the case with modem
Fourth Amendment cases "for the purpose of providing guidance to
other courts on the subject of sense-enhanced surveillance of a
home. ' 303 The court stressed that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes. It found that a thermal infrared inspection of a home was at least as intrusive as the beeper technology used
to illegally search a home in Karo.3°4
The court rejected Penny-Feeney's analysis. It found the "heat
waste" analogy unconvincing; unlike the disposal of household garbage, home residents cannot avoid the risks associated with thermal
infrared emissions, except by refraining from home activities and turning off home energy sources. 305 The court also rejected the canine
sniff analysis. It cited a Second Circuit case, United States v.
Thomas,30 6 which held that a warrantless canine sniff of a home vio-

lated the Fourth Amendment, because an individual has a heightened
expectation of privacy in the home and the canine sniff involved superior sensing capabilities to intrude upon that privacy.
In interpreting its own state constitution, the Washington court's
analysis was reminiscent of Justice Harlan's dissent in White.307 Unlike the modern Fourth Amendment threshold analysis, Washington's
inquiry is "'not confined to the subjective privacy expectations of
modern citizens who, due to well publicized advances in surveillance
technology, are learning to expect diminished privacy in many aspects
of their lives."' 308 Instead, "[w]e believe our legal right to privacy
should reflect thoughtful and purposeful choices rather than simply
' ' 3 °9
mirror the current state of the commercial technology industry.

Thus, the inquiry must focus on "'those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from
' 310
governmental trespass absent a warrant.'
302. Id. (citing Steinberg, supra note 121, at 569).
303. Id. at 601.
304. Id. at 602; see supra note 225.
305. Young, 867 P.2d at 602-03.

306. 1d. at 603-04 (citing United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985), certs. denied,
474 U.S. 819 (1985), 479 U.S. 818 (1986)).
307. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
308. Young, 867 P.2d at 597 (quoting State v. Myrick, 688 P.2d 151 (Wash. 1984)).
309. Id. at 598.
310. Id. at 597 (quoting Myrick, 688 P.2d at 154).
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CONCLUSION

Surely, our courts fail to adjudicate constitutional claims when
constitutional law is rendered impotent against the physical laws exploited by military techniques and technologies. These courts are
equating "reasonable expectations of privacy" with cynical apprehensions of what privacies, as a practical matter, can be absolutely guaranteed in our universe. This defeats the essential purpose of the Bill
of Rights. These constitutional laws work to extend protections to the
people which, as a practical matter, cannot otherwise be guaranteed.
The Fourth Amendment constitutes our nation's principle restraint on unreasonable government intrusions into the private lives of
Americans. It codifies a five-hundred year-old tradition of immunizing the sanctity of the home and the privacies of life from the arbitrary
"prying eyes of the government."' 31 1 However, in our technologically
advancing society, we are losing all meaningful restraints on arbitrary
government surveillance, as modem methods are held beyond the
Fourth Amendment threshold.
To recognize Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable remote sensing intrusions, the Supreme Court need not strain the
language of the A-nendment. On the contrary, it need only apply
common understandings of the term "search." Nor would the Court
have to stray from traditional interpretations of the Amendment. The
Court can find strong foundation in the landmark holdings of Boyd
and Katz.

311. See supra text accompanying note 45.

